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The Buddhist Icon and the Modern Gaze  
Bernard Faure 
This essay is an attempt to reconsider what vision of-that is, what dis- 
course on-Buddhist icons is possible for a Westerner (or Westernized 
Asian). Buddhist icons have been essentially the domain, or rather the 
preserve, of art historians. But Buddhist art, if there is such a thing, is 
perhaps too important to be left to art historians alone. Is there a Bud- 
dhist "art," a subcategory of Asian art, itself a rubric within world art, one 
among the many rooms in AndrC Malraux's famous "musCe imaginaire"? 
Or are we not dealing primarily with Buddhist images, whose artistic 
value is at best derivative? Even though art history is beginning to take a 
broader, even anthropological, perspective with regard to Western im- 
ages and visual culture, it is still necessary in the Asian context to shift 
the focus from traditional concerns about the history and aesthetics of art 
to the history, affect, and function of ritual images or icons. Even if we 
want to retain the notion of aesthetic value, to the extent that a narrow 
aestheticism precludes our understanding of the anthropological and 
phenomenological dimensions of Buddhist icons, we must question this 
emphasis on the aesthetic object. I want to focus precisely on the vision 
of icons, on the asymmetrical exchange of glances that characterizes icon 
worship. I have elsewhere examined the various techniques of animation 
of the Buddhist icon.' Because they are, in a manner, alive, and not sim- 
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ply dead representations, these icons are images of power. However, this 
obvious point-perhaps because it is obvious in the etymological sense 
("lying in the way"; hence preventing, making an obstacle)-has until 
recently been largely ignored by art historians, especially in studying 
Buddhist images. The notion of animated Buddhist icons has been re- 
pressed as a result of the modern and Western values of aestheticization, 
desacralization, and secularization. This situation, however, is beginning 
to ~ h a n g e . ~  In order to counteract this repression, I will take some of my 
cues from the recent work done by certain historians and from critiques 
of Western art in the wake of Walter Benjamh3 
I also want to question the scholar's instinctive reluctance to blur 
genres. What is at stake in this maintenance of the disciplinary border by 
the scholars who set themselves up as keepers of the pass, or of the pas- 
sage? This question motivates my inquiry into the need and possibility 
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for rethinking-or rather revising, reenvisioning-our understanding of 
the Buddhist icon, and by the same token perhaps modifying our gaze. 
The term icon, here, will designate mostly images such as statues and 
portraits (icons in the strict sense), but it could be extended to include 
aniconic, that is, nonanthropomorphic, symbols or diagrams (such as the 
IndianJBuddhist swastika or the wheel of the dharma). Icons, as we will 
see, are ritually animated and in this sense are not different from masks, 
puppets, or automatons, in which one finds the same "conflation of sign 
and signified" (PI, p. 32). At times, Buddhist icons are literally animated 
by the presence within them of a (supposedly) live entity. Paradoxically, 
then, the icon becomes a kind of tomb. A significant case is that of a 
Japanese stone statue of the Buddha Arnida, in which was placed the 
mummy of a Buddhist monk.* The icon becomes a container, a recipient, 
a funerary urn or stupa. 
The labyrinthine structure of my argument might be partly justified 
when we recall that Daedalus, the first maker of animated images, was 
also the inventor of the labyrinth. Daedalus was the first to open the eyes 
of the statues, and to set their feet apart (see PI, pp. 36-37). Notice here 
the symbolic equivalence between eyes and legs: it is as if the opening of 
the eyes, which gives life, were equivalent to the separation of the legs, 
which permits movement. Buddhist icons, although their eyes have been 
opened, are usually represented sitting cross-legged or standing still with 
legs joined. Only a small number of Buddhist icons, representations of 
minor deities (what the Japanese call besson, "distinct worthies," as op- 
posed to the major Buddhas, the honzon or "main worthies"), are depicted 
as dancing or gesturing wildly. On the whole, Buddhist iconology has 
valorized stillness. Buddhist icons are, strictly speaking, "still life" or "sus- 
pended animation." When they seem to be on the move, their movement 
often goes hand in hand with a certain sexualization. Whereas the hon-
zon's immobility, its self-contained appearance, symbolizes its absence of 
passions (or outflows) and its genderlessness, the besson are more dynamic 
and clearly gendered (sometimes even quite explicitly, like images of the 
goddess Benzaiten, whose unclothed body is distinctly feminine). 
The Rise of Orientalist Aesthetics 
In what follows, I first examine the aesthetics of several early 
twentieth-century art historians, some of whom became at one point pur- 
veyors of Asian art to European and American audiences. I realize that 
4. On Buddhist mummies, see Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, pp. 148-78, and Sharf, 
"The Idolization of Enlightenment: On the Mummification of Ch'an Masters in Medieval 
China," his to^ of Religions 32 (Aug. 1992): 1-31. 
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modern art historians no longer find this aesthetic discourse valid, or 
worth discussing (if they ever did). No self-respecting specialist in Indian 
or Japanese art today finds his or her references in Ananda Coomara- 
swamy or Ernest Fenollosa. I still think it necessary, however, to empha- 
size what we might call the genealogical flaw of the Euro-American 
discourse on Asian art and its replication in the "secondary Orientalism" 
of native Asians, precisely because its Orientalist origins have receded 
into a dark corner and seem to have evaded ~crutiny.~ A number of pre- 
suppositions that governed the discourse and vision of these predecessors 
are still influencing ours today. I would like to adumbrate some of these 
presuppositions by setting up a few straw men as (not so) ideal types. 
The aesthetic tendency (and secondary Orientalism) in early Japa- 
nese art history is well represented by a historian like Watsuji Tetsurd, 
who in his book Restoring the Idols compared the Buddhist revival of the 
Taishd era (1912-25) to the Western Renaissance. The title of his book is, 
however, rather misleading, since the idols thus restored "did not revert 
to being gods to be worshipped but were now appreciated as works of 
art."6 This return to antiquity was in fact, as in the French controversy 
between the Ancients and the Moderns, a departure from everything that 
had prevailed in the past; therefore, despite its title, the book advocated 
a radical modernism. The rediscovery of Buddhist doctrine and Bud- 
dhist art from the Taishd era onward followed in the wake of this 
modernist demythologization. 
Another influential writer who was among those credited with (re)- 
defining the fields of Japanese (or of Buddhist) art is Ernest Fenollosa. 
Hoping to serve as a bridge between the West and Japan, Fenollosa de- 
fined the parameters by which Chinese, Korean, and Japanese arts 
should be judged. In 1887 he received from the Japanese government 
the task of registering Japanese art treasures and through his lectures 
almost singlehandedly changed the Japanese people's perception of its 
cultural and artistic patrimony. Fenollosa was not only a fine lecturer at 
Tokyo Imperial University, he also became in 1890 the first curator of the 
Oriental collection (named after him) at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. 
He went back to Japan in 1896 and, after his death in London in 1908, 
his ashes were buried at Miidera, the Buddhist monastery on the south- 
ern bank of Lake Biwa. 
While in the United States, Fenollosa exerted a powerful influence 
5. For a recent scrutiny of some of the Orientalist presuppositions of Buddhist art, see 
"IW." For a discussion of "secondary Orientalism," see Faure, Chan Insights and Oversights: 
An Epistemological Critique of the Chan Tradition (Princeton, N.J.,  1993), pp. 52-88. 
6. William R. LaFleur, "A Turning in Taishb: Asia and Europe in the Early Writings of 
Watsuji Tetsurb," in Culture and Identity: Japanese Intellectuals during the Interwar Years, ed. J .  
Thomas Rimer (Princeton, N.J., 1990), p. 239. 
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on American art education, namely with his emphasis on the notion of 
"spacing" and his assertion that "style" was a "shibboleth," reflected in 
statements like the following: "We find that all art is harmonious spacing, 
under special technical conditions that vary."7 By attempting to give "a 
history of Oriental Art written from a universal point of view," he contrib- 
uted more than any other Westerner to the enshrinement of Buddhist 
imagery into so-called universal art (EC, 1:xxv). In the introduction to 
his Epochs of Chinese and Japanese Art, he wrote, for instance: "We are ap- 
proaching the time when the art work of all the world of man may be 
looked upon as one, as infinite variations in a single kind of mental and 
social effort" (EC, 1 :xxiv). 
The crucial role played by Fenollosa in rescuing Japanese Buddhist 
art and, as his wife, Mary, claims in her preface to his work, restoring 
Japanese "national pride and interest" cannot be denied (EC, 1:xvi). 
However, this achievement was not without cost, in artistic as well as ideo- 
logical terms. In light of our knowledge of what this restored national 
pride led to, the preface's claim that Fenollosa was "deeply stirred by the 
splendid struggle of Japan in her war with Russia" is disturbing (EC, 
1:xxi). Conflating religion and ideology, he was led to believe that the 
"passionate idealism" of "this remarkable race" had "displayed itself in 
the sacrifices of the recent Russian war" (EC, 1:155).From an art histori- 
cal point of view, the cost has to do with the aestheticization of Buddhist 
images-the purely stylistic approach to the "epochs of artn-with hardly 
a word as to the functions of and responses to this art. Fenollosa's idealiza- 
tion of Asian images as sublime works of art, comparable and even supe- 
rior in some respects to Greek art, goes hand in hand with a lack of 
interest in their cultic functions. A significant example is his account of 
the discovery in 1884 of the Yumedono Kannon of Hbryilji, an icon 
which had been kept hidden in its "Pavilion of Dreams" (yumedono) for 
centuries. But, says Fenollosa, "it was the aesthetic wonders of this work 
that attracted us most," a work that "seemed to rise to the height of ar- 
chaic Greek art," with "its rather large-almost negroid-lips, on which 
a quiet mysterious smile played, not unlike Da Vinci's Mona Lisa's" and a 
slimness "like a Gothic statue from Arniens" (EC, 1:51).8 Here is Malraux's 
"musCe imaginaire" in a nutshell: "As one stands upon the altar of Kondo, 
7 .Ernest F. Fenollosa, Epochs of Chinese and Japanese Art: An  Outline Histo7 of East Asiatzc 
Design, 2 vols. (New York, 1913), 1:xxiv; hereafter abbreviated EC. 
8. Not surprisingly, the classical reference is omnipresent in Western judgments about 
Asian art. When Aurel Stein begins to explore Buddhist sites in the Swat district of North- 
ern India with Alfred Foucher in 1896, he writes: "I feel I am on classical soil and enjoyed 
every minute" (quoted in "IW," p. 85).As Abe points out, "'Greekness' . . . serves to desig- 
nate the aesthetic superiority of the European colonial" ("IW," p. 71). This bias toward 
antiquity is still visible in the titles of majorjournals in the field: Artibus Asiae, Ars Orientalis- 
to name just a few. But in the case of Gandhara art, unlike in the present case, the thickness 
of the lips of some statues was judged as a proof of non-Greek origin; see ibid., p. 71. 
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he gets to-day a strange, weird feeling of Greekish frescoes, Norman 
hangings, Gothic statues, and Egyptian bronzes, so varied is the jumble 
of forms of a hundred sizes" (EC, 1:59). 
In all fairness, Fenollosa does at times, though rarely, depart from 
his purely aesthetic mode and reflect on the response that these icons 
could provoke from the (Christian) beholder. Thus, speaking of the Mai- 
treya of HbryGji, he writes: "The impression of this figure, as one views 
it for the first time, is of intense holiness. No serious, broad-minded 
Christian could quite free himself from the impulse to bow down before 
its sweet powerful smile. With all its primitive coarseness of detail, . . . it 
dominates the whole room like an actual presence" (EC, 1:64). But on the 
whole, he remains mainly interested in the line, color, and grace of Bud- 
dhist art, this "aesthetic flowering of the Japanese race" (EC, 1:99). When 
one of these standards is not met, he is quick to denounce the ugliness of 
what he observes, as in the case of NaraS Great Buddha, with its "ugly 
big head," reflecting "the taste of the day . . . for fat and neckless types" 
(EC, 1:109). The same is true for the Eighteen Arhats of Kodaiji, which, 
with their "evidently intentional" Semitic features, lacking any grace, he 
argues must have been found in Chinese synagogues, for "the Arabs 
hated Buddhism so heartily that they would hardly have become mis- 
taken for [arhats]" (EC, 1: 142). Fenollosa does not even mention the obvi- 
ous ideological and cultic aspects of these icons, in particular the 
Vairocana Buddha of Tbdaiji, whose ritual "eye-opening" ceremony in 
753 crowned a massive effort to gather the metal for the statue that 
strained the state's resources. 
Fenollosa's interest in line (perhaps showing the distant influence of 
Vasari) and color leads him to assert the superiority of painting over 
sculpture: "The very rhythms of line may suggest motion and transitory 
phases which are forbidden to sculpture. The latter normally registers 
the permanent; the former the process" (EC, 1:122). Sculpture seems to 
be the first stage in artistic evolution, correlated with public religious 
worship; but with the growth of individual religiosity, painting comes to 
the foreground, as for instance is the case with the "mystical," antiritualis- 
tic art of ChanlZen. We are now "to follow Chinese and Japanese art into 
the greater subtleties of painting, the ripe stage of infinite modulations 
in line and colour" (EC, 1: 123). Because painting constitutes the ultimate 
reference, Buddhist sculpture is judged on the basis of its lines, the grace 
of its forms. When the line fails, it may be partly redeemed by the richness 
of the color, but in most cases ugliness ensues. 
For Fenollosa, therefore, as for historians of Western art like Hein- 
rich WolMlin, the history of art is one of the development of forms.g This 
9. See Heinrich Wolfflin, Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style 
in Later Art, trans. M .  D. Hottinger (New York, 1950). 
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emphasis on the stylistic form prevented him, and many after him, from 
reflecting on the ritual context of the icons he discovered. Aesthetic con- 
siderations have steered us away, for instance, from exploring all the im- 
plications of the well-known (and often mentioned) fact that the Guze 
Kannon icon and the ~akyamuni con at Hdryfiji were made the size of 
the ruler Shdtoku Taishi (572-621). The size of an icon was one of the 
essential elements in the success of a ritual. As Sylvain LCvi pointed out 
in his analysis of Vedic sacrifice, "the sacrifice is the man. The sacrifice is 
the man because it is man who offers it; and every time it is offered, the 
sacrifice has the size of the man."1° The Guze Kannon is even believed to 
be an image of Shdtoku Taishi, made while he was alive. In other words, 
whereas these icons were substitute bodies, tokens of immortality, many 
of us, a century after Fenollosa, still see them as items in the catalogue of 
the ''musC.e imaginaire," next to the Venus de Milo, the Mona Lisa, and 
Rodin's The Thinker. To give just one example, quoted with approbation 
by a contemporary art historian, Karl Jaspers saw the famous Maitreya 
icon of Kdryiiji as a "symbol of the purest, the most harmonious and the 
most eternal [sic] of the human 'being,' freed from the hindrances of the 
temporal that rules over this earth."" No doubt Jaspers would have been 
surprised to hear that-unlike in the case of the Venus de Milo, whose 
beauty is enhanced by her incompleteness-when a finger of this Mai- 
treya was broken by a high-school student in 1960, the whole country 
followed the media's hour-by-hour account of the recovery of the 
wounded icon. All this does not detract from Fenollosa's achievements- 
or does it? At the very least, one could say of him what he says of one of 
his predecessors: "Marco Polo is surely worth something" (EC, l :xxix).12 
10. "Le sacrifice, c'est l'homme. Le sacrifice est l'homme car c'est l'homme qui l'offre; 
et chaque fois qu'il est offert, le sacrifice a la taille de l'homme" (Catapatha-Brahmans, 
quoted in Sylvain Lkvi, La  Doctrine d u  sacrifice duns les Brahmanas 11898; Paris, 19661, p. 77). 
11. Quoted in Fransois Berthier, Gendse de la sculpture bouddhique japonaise (Paris, 1979), 
p. 313. The formalist approach of Japanese art historians to Buddhist sculpture is well 
documented (and replicated) in Berthier's book. 
12. Another representative instance of the aestheticizing tendency is Hisamatsu 
Shin'ichi's construction of a Zen aesthetics under a definition so broad that it allowed him, 
like Fenollosa's friend Okakura Kakuzb and Suzuki Daisetsu, the scholar and lay Zen prac- 
titioner who popularized Zen in the United States, to include under the banner of Zen a 
broad variety of cultural products such as the tea ceremony, flower arrangement, nb theater, 
and haiku poetry. I have discussed this aspect of Zen ideology elsewhere. See Faure, Chan 
Insights and Oversights, pp. 52-88. Hisamatsu defines Zen aesthetics under seven rubrics: 
asymmetry, simplicity, timelessness, naturalness, subtle profundity (ycgen), freedom from 
convention or attachment, and aloneness. See Gregory Noyes, "The ~ a i n b o w  of Zen Aes- 
thetics" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1993). For a direct contact with Zen ideology, see 
Hisamatsu Shin'ichi, Zen and the Fine Arts, trans. Tokiwa Gishin (Tokyo, 1971); Okakura Ka- 
kuzb, The Ideals of the East, with Special Reference to the Art o m a n  (London, 1903); and Daisetz 
T. Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, 2d ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1970). 
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The Sacralization of Art and the Profanation of Icons 
In the case of the Yumedono Kannon as in many others, Fenollosa, 
acting on behalf of the Meiji government, was able to requisition the 
opening of the pavilion, despite the protestations of the resident monks: 
"They resisted long, alleging that in punishment for the sacrilege an 
earthquake might well destroy the temple. Finally we prevailed, and I 
shall never forget our feelings as the long disused key rattled in the rusty 
lock. Within the shrine appeared a tall mass closely wrapped about in 
swathing bands of cotton cloth, upon which the dust of ages had gath- 
ered." The atmosphere of profanation that prevails here recalls the West- 
ern discovery of Egyptian mummies, but this violence in the name of art 
is well worth it in Fenollosa's text, since "at last the final folds of the cov- 
ering fell away, and this marvellous statue, unique in the world, came 
forth to human sight for the first time in centuries" (EC, 1:50). 
The earlier mention of Malraux in relation to the notion of universal 
art, of the "musCe imaginaire" (an expression that E. H. Gombrich trans- 
lates as "Museum of the mind"), is significant in other respects as well.13 
One of the lesser claims to fame of this colorful figure, who became the 
first minister of culture of the Fifth Republic, is the story of his arrest in 
his youth for stealing the head of a Buddhist statue from Angkor. Art and 
violence form an old couple, and Buddhist temples, from India to Japan, 
were plundered long before Malraux. When Indiana Jones tries to re- 
trieve a precious cross from the hands of avid collectors, angrily pro- 
testing, "It belongs in a museum!" he is more akin to the thieves than he 
might think.14 However, this plundering was usually committed for venal 
reasons, rarely in the name of aesthetics (and even when it was, as in 
Malraux's case, aesthetics seems more like an alibi or an afterthought- 
or perhaps a mark of remorse). This enshrining of aesthetic pieces (and 
fragments) in the temple of art by profaning the icons of the temple (liter- 
ally, bringing them from inside the temple to outside, in broad daylight, 
in front of the temple (pro fanum]) brings to mind an even more dramatic 
case, that of Victor Segalen, a noted French poet and novelist, who also 
became well known in the sinological field for his research on Chinese 
archeology. In his epigraph to Segalen's book, The Great Statuary of China, 
Malraux writes: "The great poet who wrote Stiles here reveals to us, as 
no one had ever done before and as no one since has done, the spirit of 
the art he studied. In its field, this book is irreplaceable."15 One wonders 
whether Malraux knew about the following incident, narrated by Sega- 
13. E. H. Gombrich, "Malraux's Philosophy of Art in Historical Perspective," in Andre' 
Malraux, ed. Harold Bloom (New York, 1988), p. 137. 
14. Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade, prod. George Lucas and Frank Marshall, dir. 
Steven Spielberg, 1989. 
15.AndrC Malraux, epigraph to Victor Segalen, The Great Statuary of China, trans. Elea- 
nor Levieux, ed. A. Joly-Segalen (Chicago, 1978); hereafter abbreviated GS. 
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len's companion, Gilbert de Voisins. If he had, would it have changed his 
appreciation of Segalen as a great poet uniquely able to reveal to us the 
spirit of Chinese art? Or would the revelation of this dirty secret have, on 
the contrary, illuminated in his eyes the essence of connoisseurship? 
On 29 August 1909, upon stopping to visit a dilapidated pagoda on 
the roadside, Segalen and de Voisins discover a splendid statue of Buddha: 
Despite its missing two arms and a torso that seemed to be in poor 
shape, this life-size statue is still alive: its profile has retained its nobil- 
ity, its eyes their gaze, the smile of its mouth its generous sweetness 
and a kind of ironv.-This statue. we must have it! We won't leave it 
as if it were a mere bronze vase! We will not leave without it! With 
chosen words that bind us, we make a pledge.-This is all very well, 
but how should we proceed? Take it? Steal it?-It would be impos- 
sible for us even to lift that ~ i e c e  of wood! Verv well then! We will 
cut its head! Immediately, fetching an axe from our luggage, we un- 
dertake the sacrilegious work. With all my strength, I strike the first 
blow on the golden neck, but I hardly make a mark on this age-old 
wood. We struggle in vain. Segalen strikes with all his strength, with- 
out anv more success. This lasts for about half an hour. when iust as 
J we are about to give up . . . two peasants who were passing on the 
road, attracted by the noise, enter suddenly. We feel quite embar- 
rassed, our cynicism has its limits. . . .To pollute a temple by debas- 
ing the statue of its god is an act for which there is hardly any excuse. 
But the newcomers, far from showing any anger or indignation, be- 
have, on the contrary, in a way that stupefies us: they offer to help 
us!-First, they make us understand that it is pointless to try to be- 
head this Buddha, which is too heavy, while standing. They lay it 
down on its face, with its head on a block, put wedges under its sides, 
fix it with straw plugs, and finally, laughing at our clumsiness, take 
the axe from our hands. With a few well-directed strokes, crackles, 
an atrocious tear, it is done; the beheading is perpetrated. In the 
chest we find some cash, which we leave to our accomplices, and 
papers, which I keep. Our horses are now stamping in the mud. We 
jump into the saddle without further delay and ride away. . . . On the 
way back, Segalen imagines the plot of a nice story, based on our 
action today. He is so ashamed of this sacrilege that he wants to jus- 
tify himself to posterity. In particular, he is so ashamed of our impu- 
nity that he heaps a thousand calamities, each more atrocious than 
the other, on the main character of his story. In this way, he believes 
that he can to some extent avoid them himself. Only when he laid 
out the conclusion of his story, which I may add is perfectly horrible, 
did he perhaps feel relieved and find his peace of mind again.16 
16. Augusto Gilbert de Voisins, ~ c r i ten Chine, in Le Voyage en Chine: Anthologie des voya- 
geurs occidentaux du Moyen Age a la chute de I'Empire chinois, ed. Ninette Boothroyd, Muriel 
Dttrie, and Fernand Bunel (Paris, 1992), pp. 1053-54. 
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Interestingly, Segalen exorcizes or placates one double (the icon) by pun- 
ishing another (the character in his story). 
Would Segalen have committed the same profanation if the icon had 
not been a Buddhist one? Sometimes the idealization of one type of art 
is achieved at the cost of another. Segalen calls Buddhist sculptures "out- 
growths of apostolic Hinduism" and refuses to consider them as examples 
of "China's true statues" (GS, p. 15). These sculptures, being the "repeti- 
tion of one monotonous type," are "of the same stiff ecstasy" and are "nei- 
ther beautiful nor Chinese" (GS, p. 121). Segalen deplores the tragedy 
that famous sites such as Yungang and Longmen are "no longer anything 
but an empty sponge, a once-living core putrefied by the hand of man" 
(GS, p. 122). He does not try to hide his prejudice against Buddhism, 
"what we must call and consider China's major heresy, her fault, her slav- 
ery" (GS, p. 79). If he feels obliged to talk about Buddhist art at all, it is 
"in order to challenge and reject the lyrical admiration with which that 
'art' had been treatedH-an art "so remote, so exotic, so waning" com- 
pared to the "pure, intrinsic, inherently Chinese nature of the genius 
of ancient China expressed in three-dimensional stone" (GS, pp. 128, 
1 19).17 Yet the Buddhist statue was beautiful enough, with the "generous 
sweetness" and the "kind of irony" of its smile, for Segalen to desire its 
possession at any cost. 
The point is not to lay blame on some individuals in order to exoner- 
ate ourselves more easily but rather to register the intrinsic violence of 
the modern gaze and discourse, the predatory nature of our relation with 
non-Western cultures-a violence so deeply embedded that it infected 
even the best minds, but a desecration that is also perhaps incited by the 
sacred icon itself.'The commodity fetishism that characterizes much of 
the discourse about art today may be simply another expression of the 
intrinsic violence done to the image, although it can also be analyzed as 
part of the lingering fascination exerted by it, and as a way of recharging 
things with alienated "powers." Or again, as Freedberg argues, the vio- 
lence might be done not only to the object but to oneself. The aesthetic 
mode of thought might be the active repression of an animistic belief in 
the power of images, the very kind of repression of outdated feelings that 
17. See also Yvonne Y. Hsieh, Victor SegalenS Literary Encounter with China: Chinese 
Moulds, Western Thoughts (Toronto, 1988), pp. 31, 107-8. 
18. Another case in point is that of Michel Leiris, a surrealist writer who became an 
ethnographer when he joined the mission organized by Marcel Griaule in Africa to collect 
specimens of African art and culture for the Muste de I'Homme. Leiris denounces colonial 
violence, but he also recounts in his diary, later published despite Griaule's opposition un- 
der the title ZAfrique f adme ,  how he stole precious fetishes from unsuspecting villagers. On 
Griaule, Leiris, and Segalen, see James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century 
Ethnography, Lzterature, and Art (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), pp. 55-90, 152-74. 
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Freud sees as the source of the uncanny. As the above example suggests, 
there is sometimes a fine line between iconophilia and icon~clasm. '~ 
The Desire for Vision 
If unlike the devotional or ritualistic approach-and more than the 
traditional Buddhist emphasis on beauty-the modern aesthetic ap- 
proach is essentially a strategy for containing the "impure" (sexual or 
magical) elements of cultural artifacts, we need to move beyond aesthetic 
discourse to consider the abundant, yet neglected, anthropological data 
regarding (and regarded by) the icon. Among these we might want to 
include Indian and Chinese notions about the gaze (in Sanskrit, dars'an), 
the stupa (a reliquary mound housing the relics of the Buddha or of a 
saint), the tessera (in Chinese, fu), and power (in Chinese, ling).'O A case 
for the importance of context has been made by Edmund Leach, who 
argues that icons are part of a "space syntax" of sacred buildings (and, we 
could add, of domestic worship) and that one cannot remove them from 
this context without entirely changing their nature.21 For Leach, "works 
of art are not just things in themselves, they are objects carrying moral 
implications. What the moral implication is depends upon where they 
are" ("GH," p. 256). What we call the loss of aura results in this case from 
the displacement of the icon from its religious context and not merely, as 
Walter Benjamin argued, from mechanical reproduction. Although some 
icons are displaced a great deal in traditional cultures and actually derive 
much of their power from this, their displacement does not entail a dis- 
location of their meaning. One could perhaps distinguish between the 
19. A similar point is made, in a different context, by Mitchell in his discussion of the 
modern "rhetoric of iconoclasm." See Mitchell, Iconology, pp. 160-208. On the Buddhist 
"rhetoric of iconoclasm," see Richard Gombrich, "The Consecration of a Buddhist Image," 
Journal of Asian Studies 26 (Nov. 1966): 23-36. 
20. On the animate icon, see Richard Gombrich, "The Consecration of a Buddhist 
Image," and Strickmann, Mantras et mandarins. On the Indian "gaze" (darian),see J. Gonda, 
Eye and Gaze in the Veda (Amsterdam, 1969); on the tessera, see Max Kaltenmark, "Ling-pao: 
Note sur un terme du tao'isme religieux," in MAanges publib par l'lnstitut des Hautes ~ t u d e s  
Chinoises, 2 vols. (Paris, 1960), 1:559-88; on the stupa, see Mus's monumental work, Barabu-
dur; on power, see Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert, A General Theory of Magic, trans. Robert 
Brain (New York, 1972); Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, TheBuddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult 
of Amulets: A Study in Charisma, Hagiography, Sectarianism, and Millenial Buddhism (Cambridge, 
1984); and PI. 
21. Edmund R. Leach, "The Gatekeepers of Heaven: Anthropological Aspects of 
Grandiose Architecture," Journal of Anthropologzcal Research 39 (Fall 1983): 244; hereafter 
abbreviated "GH." The worst-case scenario, only too common, is that of these icons who, 
like the Buddha from Hoti Mardan described by Foucher, came to decorate the mess hall 
of a British frontier garrison, "leaning against the wall of the dining-room and no longer 
inhaling any incense but the smoke of cigars" (quoted in "IW," pp. 85-86). 
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syntactic level, on which an icon appears as part of an iconological struc- 
ture or network (a triad, and so forth), and the semantic level, which 
abstracts that icon from its synchronic or metonymic associations not in 
order to re-create another sequence, a diachronic one, but rather to focus 
on its individual aura, its unique presence. Leach focusses on group rep- 
resentations, in which "the jumble is the message" ("GH," p. 250). A case 
in point, which both he and Rolf Stein study, is the representation of the 
Gatekeepers-who usually form a "dual" of persons, a pair of twins that 
should not be separated." In the twin pagodas of Zayton (Quanzhou), 
studied by Gustav Ecke and Paul DemiCville, icons are structurally 
paired.23 These pagodas, whose photographic study necessitated the con- 
struction of a complex scaffolding, reveal another interesting fact: in 
many cases icons are not there to be seen, either because they are placed 
too high or because they are buried (literally encrypted) or kept hidden 
(the so-called hibutsu, or "hidden Buddhas")." A dominant metaphor in 
art nowadays, which explains the art critic's interest in a hermeneutic 
or semiotic approach and Leach's structuralism, is that of the text to be 
deciphered (dk-crypti). However, images are not simply there to be seen 
or read. Even in the case of icons carved on a stupa, "circumambulation 
does not lend itself to aesthetic c~ntemplation."~~ 
Despite its highly abstract metaphysics, Buddhism, through its iconic 
and ritualistic tendency, remains an eminently concrete religion. As noted 
above, the cult of icons is characterized by strategies of presence. The 
notion of presence might seem too reminiscent of Christianity, but in this 
respect Christian iconology itself, unlike Jewish iconoclasm, savored of 
paganism. Christianity (or Western philosophy, according to Derrida) 
does not have the privilege of a "metaphysics of pre~ence."'~ Such a meta- 
physics is one of the most commonly used strategies and one of the most 
common features of religious ideologies across cultures. 
The figurative practice in China has its antecedents in magical con- 
ceptions related to witchcraft, funerary, and ritual practices, in contrast 
22. See "GH," and RolfA. Stein, "The Guardian of the Gate: An Example of Buddhist 
Mythology, from India to Japan," in Asian Mythologies, trans. Wendy ~ o n i ~ e r  et al., ed. Yves 
Bonnefoy (Chicago, 1991), pp. 122-36. As Roland Barthes pointed out, the French word 
duel has both the meanings of "duel," or contest, and "dual," the category in Greek grammar 
between singular and plural. See Roland Barthes, "Introduction to the Structural Analysis 
of Narratives," Image-Music-Text,trans. and ed. Stephen Heath (New York, 1977), p. 108. 
23. See G. Ecke and P. Demitville, The Twin Pagodas of Zayton: A Study ofLater Buddhist 
Sculpture in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1935). 
24. The same is true of Buddhist relics and regalia. See, for instance, Faure, "Relics, 
Regalia, and the Ideology of Secrecy," in Rending the Tieil, ed. Eliott Wolfson (forthcoming). 
25. Stella Kramrisch, Exploring India's Sacred Art: Selected Wn'tings of Stella Kramrisch, ed. 
Barbara Stoler Miller (Philadelphia, 1983), p. 2 17; hereafter abbreviated EI. 
26. On the metaphysics b f  presence, see Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, 1974). 
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to the figurative practice of the West, where a clear break seems to have 
o~curred. '~The Western image is, in the words of Jean-Pierre Vernant, 
"only resemblance," and "this pure similitude that defines its nature of 
image marks it with the seal of a total irreality."2Wowever, the contrast 
is perhaps not as clear-cut as Hubert Delahaye, for one, thinks. Delahaye 
nevertheless makes the interesting point that statues in China do not re- 
flect a divine reality; they are not mere illusions or repositories of a higher 
power, but refer only to themselves-a signifier without signified, as it 
were. As we will see, this is not always the case for Chinese sculpture, or 
at least for Buddhist icons. 
In some cases, Buddhist icons were so true to life as to be endowed 
with viscera, the most famous example being that of Seirydji in Kyoto, a 
wooden Buddha dated 985, in which five cloth entrails were found along 
with a variety of votive objects and relics. Likewise the statue of the Bud- 
dhist master Zendd (Shandao) at Chion-in contains a number of objects 
(a mirror, coins, written prayers, and so forth). Some of these "stuffed" 
Buddhas are verisimilar to the point of having inlaid glass eyes. The 
blood, sweat, and tears of sculptures were usually seen as bad omens. 
Sometimes icons grow hair or eyebrows, another ominous sign, or cry 
for help when robbers come to steal them. Sometimes the icon can be a 
stupa, as in the following story: Having noticed an old woman clirnbing a 
mountain every day to worship a stupa, some youths ask her why she 
takes such pains. She answers that it is because of a prophecy that the 
apparition of blood on this stupa would mean an imminent disaster. The 
youths decide to smear the stupa with blood to laugh at the old woman's 
expense. The next day, when she sees the blood on the stupa, she runs 
down the mountain and leaves the village. Soon after, a sudden flood 
devastates the valley, fulfilling the prophecyzg I will return to the equiva- 
lence between stupa and icon below. 
There are many cases like the following, in which h i a n  icons, be- 
cause of their verisirnilitude, their rnirnetic quality, are able to arouse 
people. Here are a couple of Chinese examples: 
During the Xianning era of the Song, three young men went to a 
sanctuary on Mount Jiang. There were several statues of very beauti- 
ful and worthy women. The young men got drunk, and everyone 
chose a statue as a spouse and began to flirt with her. They [played] 
thus until the evening; during the night, they all had the same 
dream, in which the lord of Mount Jiang sent a messenger who trans- 
27. See Hubert Delahaye, "Les AntCctdents magiques des statues chinoises," Revue 
d'esthetzque, n.s., 5 (1983): 45-53; hereafter abbreviated "AM." 
28. Jean-Pierre Vernant, " ~ t u d e  comparte des religions antiques," Annuaire du Collige 
de France 77 (1977): 426. 
29. See lihnjaku monogatari shzi, trans. and ed. Bernard Frank, under the title I-listoires 
qui sont maintenant du passe (Paris, 1968),pp. 94-96. 
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mitted this message: "My daughters are all old and ugly, and yet we 
have received the favor of your homages and solicitude. We must 
therefore fix the day and month when you will all meet again for 
the wedding."30 
Soon after, all the young men died. Another story is found in Hong Mai's 
Yijian zhi (Record of the Listener), from the second half of the twelfth 
century: 
There was in Chaojue monastery . . . a hall of the Mother with Nine 
Children. It was on the top of the mountain. A lay practitioner 
named Huang went to offer incense and lamps, and, among the stat- 
ues, he took [particular] care of a statue of a wet nurse. Her breasts 
hung outside her robe, offering a pleasant sight. Every time he came, 
he caressed her breasts with sighs of pleasure. One morning, the 
statue moved her eyes and got up. She took him by the hand, led 
him behind a screen, and they had intercourse. From that day on- 
ward, they maintained the habit. After several months, the man fell 
ill and had to stay in bed. However, he continued to climb the moun- 
tain. The abbot of the monastery spied on him, and saw a woman 
welcoming him with laughter halfway to the top. The next day the 
abbot followed him: the woman was there again. The abbot hit her 
with a staff, and she collapsed on the ground. In the terracotta frag- 
ments [of the statue] he found a fetus which seemed to have been 
gestating for several months. He ordered Huang to take it home; 
then suddenly the fetus broke in a thousand pieces. [Huang] mixed 
[bits of] the fetus into a drug which he then swallowed, and subse- 
quently re~overed.~'  
We find here a very concrete description of fetishism as the animation of 
an object through the projection of one's own life. If unchecked, such 
alienation leads to the death of the fetishist, through the birth of his 
double.32 
In Japan, the best-known story is that of Kichijdten (in Sanskrit, 
Laksmi) in the Nihon rydiki (Record of Miraculous Stories from Japan): In 
a mountain temple of Chinu there was a clay image of the goddess Kich- 
ijd. A lay brother who lived in the temple was attracted to the female 
image, felt desire, and fell in love with it. This Buddhist Pygmalion 
prayed to the goddess six times a day, asking her to give him a beautiful 
woman like herself. Subsequently he dreamed that he had sexual inter- 
course with the goddess; the next morning he discovered a stain on the 
skirt of her image. Seeing this, he repented, saying, "'I prayed to you to 
30. Lu Xun, Gu xiaoshuogouchen (Hong Kong, 1970), p. 428; quoted in "AM," p. 48. 
31. Hong Mai, Yzj'zan zhi, ed. Congshu Jicheng (Beijing, 1981), p. 129; quoted in "AM," 
p. 51. 
32. For a discussion of the Marxist notion of fetishism, see Mitchell, Zconology, pp. 
185-96. 
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give me a woman like yourself, but what a sacrifice you made to give 
yourself to me."' He was too ashamed to tell others, but the whole affair 
was eventually discovered, and villagers found the stain on the statue. 
The text concludes by saying that "deep faith never fails to gain re-
~ p o n s e . " ~ ~  
Delahaye contrasts the world of Chinese painters, who were usually 
literati and therefore opposed to magical aspects of their art, to that of 
sculptors and craftsmen, who remained closer to the cultic context of 
popular culture. In both cases, however, image makers were seen as 
demiurges, able, like Pygmalion, to breathe life into their creations. Even 
the most abstract concepts of Chinese aesthetics betray their magic ori- 
gins. As noted above, the lifelike nature of the icon manifests itself in its 
movement: icons can speak, walk, fly. Sometimes the icon walks around 
its own pedestal, from which it has climbed down. The first Buddhist 
image was also the first icon that moved. Here is how the Gaoseng zhuan 
(Biographies of Eminent Monks) tells the story of the origin of this icon: 
The Buddha had gone ninety days earlier to the Trayastrimia 
Heaven to preach the Law to his mother. King Prasenajit [or, in a 
variant, King Udayana], regretting not being able to see him, had a 
statue carved in sandalwood . . . and had it placed at the spot where 
the Buddha used to sit. Later, when the Buddha returned to his vi- 
hara, the statue came out to welcome him. The Buddha said: "Re- 
turn to your seat. After my nirvana, you will serve as model to the 
four categories of followers." The statue sat down. This statue is the 
first of a m~l t i tude . "~  
A replica of this icon (or, in some versions, the original-which was, of 
course, already in a sense a replica) was allegedly brought to Japan by the 
priest Chdnen at the end of the eleventh century and enshrined at Seir- 
ydji (Shakadd) in Kyoto. This icon is the one in which cloth viscera were 
found, a fact that in part explains its vitality. However, in China, the no- 
tion of live icons predates Buddhism, and animated effigies were already 
found in the tombs of the Han. Of course, this widespread cultural notion 
ran against the intellectualist approach of doctrinal Buddhism. In the 
early canonical scriptures, one often reads that the Buddha is not in his 
image. In the Daoxingjing, for instance, the Bodhisattva Dharmodgata 
33. "On Lustful Love for the Image of Kichijd-tennyo, Which Responded with an 
Extraordinary Sign," Miraculous Stones from the Japanese Buddhist Tradition: The "Nihon Rydzki" 
ofthe Monk Kydkai, trans. Kyoko Motomochi Nakamura (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), p. 178. 
34. Gaoseng rhuan, in Taishd shinshzi daizdkye ed. Takakusu Junjird and Watanabe Kai- 
gyoku, 100 vols. (Tokyo, 1924-32), 50:860b. On the legend ofthe Buddha image, see IlObOg-
irin: Dictionnaire encyclopidique du bouddhisme d'apres les sources chinoises et japonaises, ed. 
Demikville, Lkvi, and J .  Takakusu, s.v. "Butsuzb," and Donald F. McCallum, The Zenkqi Icon: 
A Study in Medzeval Japanese Religious Art (Princeton, N.J . ,  1994). 
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asks his disciple, Sadfiprarudita, "0Noble One, would you say that the 
Buddha's spirit is in the image?" Sadaprarudita replies, "It is not there. 
The image of the Buddha is made (only) because one desires to have men 
acquire merit."35 
Similarly, the well-known story in which Upagupta asks the Tempter 
Miira to impersonate the Buddha hkyamuni is an early attempt to dis- 
tinguish Buddhist icon worship from "pagan" fetishism: When the patri- 
arch Upagupta wants to see the Buddha, the demon Mfira impersonates 
him, to Upagupta's delight. However, Upagupta makes it clear that his 
devotion goes to the Buddha, not to M31-a.~~ We are reminded of the 
Byzantine iconodules' statement that the devotion goes to the prototype 
and that the image and the prototype are not to be c~nfused.~ '  
These stories suggest that in most cases the icon finds its origin in a 
desire for vision and/or presence. The same desire is found at the source 
of Christian icons. Like King Prasenajit (or Udayana) requesting the right 
to make an image of the Buddha bkyamuni, Saint Veronica, in one ver- 
sion of her legend, asks for an image of the Christ as a substitute when 
she is about to be deprived of his presence. In response, Christ presses 
his face on a cloth and leaves an impression of his features: a true image 
(see PI, p. 207). This legend eventually merged with another legend, that 
of the holy shroud, perceived as a vera eikon (whence derives the name 
Veronica). Yet, whereas a subjective vision might easily lead to aesthetic 
contemplation, the Buddhist desire for vision is not purely assertive: the 
beholder wants also to be beheld, to dwell in the benefic, transformative 
gaze of the icon. The icon is also at the center of meditation (dhydna, 
"visualization"): here too we have a form of image making, one that re- 
sults in a mental 
The intimate relationship between the icon, the god, and the be- 
liever can also be observed in China and Japan in the cases of people 
who, in times of drought, attempt to coerce the deity by making its icon 
suffer from exposure to the sun, or by throwing the icon into the water 
because the god has failed to protect them from a disease.39 In some of 
35. Lewis R. Lancaster, "An Early Mahiyina Sermon about the Body of the Buddha 
and the Making of Images," Artibus Asiae 36, no. 4 (1974): 289. 
36. See Hijbcigirin, s.v. "Butsuz6." For this story, see also John S. Strong, The Legend of  
Upagupta: Sanskrit Buddhism in North India and Southern Asia (Princeton, N.J., 1992), pp.  
104-17.  
37. See the rendition of Divydvaddna in Ananda K .  Coomaraswamy, The Transformation 
ofNature in Art (New York, 1934), p. 102. 
38. On the "visualization" of images according to Buddhist scriptures, see Demitville 
and mile Benveniste, "Note sur le fragment sogdien du Buddhadhyrinasamridh~garaszitraaaa 
Journal Asiatique 223 (0ct.-Dec. 1933): 193-248. 
39. On this point, see Alvin Cohen, "Coercing Rain Deities in Ancient China," History 
of Religzons 17 (Feb.-May 1978): 244-65. 
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these stories, the god appears subsequently in the dreams of other monks 
to complain about this harsh treatment.40 At any rate, the icon seems to 
offer a direct access to the god and to allow for all kinds of spiritual black- 
mail or hostage taking. 
The "true images" (zhenxiang or chinzo), portraits of ChanIZen mas- 
ters that have long aroused the interest of art historians because of their 
so-called realism, must be understood against their funerary backdrop." 
This is not true, of course, of all Buddhist icons, strictly speaking. In 
Chinese, the term used to qualify powerful icons, ling (usually translated 
as "power" or "efficacy"), generally connotes death." Even in the case of 
icons such as those deriving from the image made by King Udayana, one 
could perhaps argue that ~ak~amuni ' s  departure to the Trayastrimia 
Heaven was a kind of anticipation of his great departure into nirvana. In 
this sense, the image is not so different from a chinz6; each is a Vera eikon, 
a true image. 
There appear to be some exceptions. For instance, a distinction may 
be drawn between images used as aids for meditation and images that 
serve as channels of power in a cultic context. At first glance, a visual aid 
for meditation seems to have little to do with death. But perhaps the 
cultic logic at work in these, too, has something uncanny about it, and as 
this is the case, the funerary chinzd can be taken as paradigmatic for this 
sort of image, as well. The funeral of the Chan master is reminiscent of 
what the Romans called a funus imaginarium, an "imaginary" funeral, or, 
more precisely, a "funeral for an imago," in which the portrait of the de- 
ceased takes the corpse's place.43 Florence Dupont points out that the 
imago "is the trace, not the figuration, of the deceased. . . .This presence 
is real, and has nothing to do with the presence/absence of images that 
merely resemble him."44 
40. See, for instance, in the Jingde chuandenglu (Record of the Transmission of the 
Flame in the Jingde), the story of the "mad monk" Shide, who beats up a monastery god 
for seeming unable to protect the monastery (Taishd shinshzi daizdkyo, 51:434a); or, in 
Mangen Shiban, Enpd dentoroku (Record of the Transmission of the Flame in the Enp6; 
1706), the case of the Zen monk Kyd6 Unryd (1267-1341), who threw the mountain god of 
Hakusan into a pond after this deity had failed to protect his community from an epidemic 
(see Enpo dentoroku in Daz Nzhon bukkyo rensho, ed. Takakusu Junjird et al., 150 vols. [1931; 
Tokyo, 1970-731, 108:212a). Incidentally, the fact that not only children but also adults are 
affected (although in different fashions) by the violence done to inanimate figures was 
brought home to me on the occasion of my daughter's birthday as I watched the beating of 
a piAata. 
41. See Foulk and Sharf, "On the Ritual Use of Ch'an Portraiture in Medieval China." 
42. To give just a couple of examples, a lingwei is a tablet placed in front of the coffin, 
a lingwu, a paper house burned at funerary rituals. 
43. Florence Dupont, "The Emperor-God's Other Body," in Fragments for a History of 
the Human Body, ed. Michel Feher, Ramona Nadaff, and Nadia Tazi, 3 vols. (New York, 
1989), 3:403. 
44. Ibid., p. 413. Although we are dealing with a different context, it is particularly 
interesting that the term representatcon, in French royal funerary rituals, means a catafalque, 
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The theme of the animation of the icon is found across times and 
cultures, from Pygmalion to Chinese painters like Gu Kaizhi, who lived 
in the fourth century.45 It accounts for the liveliness, or potential for liveli- 
ness, of images. The effects of this animation can sometimes remain invis- 
ible, but can sometimes also be quite dramatic, as in the following account 
from the biography of the Tantric priest Vajrabodhi: 
The Emperor ordered Vajrabodhi to set up an altar in order to pray 
for rain. Vajrabodhi thereupon called on AmoghZnkuSa, according 
to the bodhisattva ritual, and erected an altar. . . . He himself painted 
an image of the Bodhisattva of Seven Kotis [that is, Guanyin], and set 
the date to "open its eyes," so that at dawn of that day it would 
rain. . . . On the seventh day, the air was hot and dry; there were no 
clouds in the sky. But in the afternoon when the eyes [of the statue] 
were opened, a northwest wind immediately began to blow. Tiles flew 
off roofs and trees were uprooted. Thundering clouds burst forth 
with rain, startling those near and far. And in the place of the altar, 
a hole broke through the room so that the ritual arena was deluged. 
The next morning, gentlemen and commoners of the capital all said, 
"Vajrabodhi captured a dragon which broke out of the room and 
flew away." Hundreds of thousands of people daily came to look at 
the place. Such is the divine efficacy of the "altar ritual."46 
Likewise, we are told that the dragon paintings of Fuxing were used to 
make the rain fall, while the lion paintings of Puyangcheng healed people 
afflicted with malaria. 
The animation process of Buddhist icons corresponds to what the 
Greeks called stoicheiosis, in which talismanic powers are brought to an 
icon through the introduction of mineral or vegetal substances, or even 
sometimes of small animals (lizards), but also through inscribed seals or 
incen~e.~ 'It is at times difficult to distinguish between relics and ex-votos 
inside Buddhist icons. But the placing of relics inside an icon is not every- 
thing. More fundamentally, icons are alive because they have been con- 
secrated. This also explains why they can, and in some cases must, be 
desecrated. The iconoclast's attempt to destroy the icons is still an ac- 
knowledgement of their power, an affirmation qua negation. This kind 
a funerary effigy. On this question, see Ralph E. Giesey, The Royal Funeral Ceremony in Renazs- 
sance France (Geneva, 1960). 
45. According to Audrey Spiro, Gu Kaizhi's famous line on dotting the eyes of a por- 
trait ("'What conveys the spirit and portrays the likeness lies precisely in these dots"') must 
be understood in the context of ritual empowerment (Audrey Spiro, "New Light on Gu 
Kaizhi: Windows of the Soul," Journal of Chinese Religzons 16 [Fall 19881: 1). 
46. Zanning, Songgaosengzhuan, in Taisho'shinshti daizakyo, 50:71 lc. An earlier transla- 
tion of this biography may be found in Chou Yi-Liang, "Tantrism in China," Haruard Journal 
ofAsiatic Studies 8 (1944-45): 276-77. 
47. On this question, see Strickmann, Mantras et mandarins, pp. 165-21 1. 
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of desecration seems fundamentally different (or is it?) from the Western 
profanation described above. And if, in some cases, it can be seen not 
only as a response to but also as part of the icon's power, should we speak 
of the icon's masochism? 
Many characteristic features of the Buddhist icon-consecration and 
insertion of relics, for example-are found traditionally in the Western 
tradition, too. This does not mean that we can project into Buddhism a 
Western, Christian metaphysics of presence but rather that there are 
some phenomenological constants in the human response to images. 
Sometimes Buddhist mummies, too, were used just like icons, as when 
the "flesh-body" of the Chan patriarch Huineng (d. 713) was paraded 
through town on a palanquin in times of drought, as a substitute for 
the icon of the Bodhisattva Guanyin. The description of this "celebrated 
monster" given by Jesuit missionaries suggests that, like popular icons, 
this mummy had been blackened by the smoke of incense." This raises 
the question of whether this flesh-body is the same as the lacquered, 
golden-colored mummy that was until recently visible at the Nanhua 
Monastery near Canton. It seems that one may discern in Buddhism two 
notions of presence, which perhaps entail two different conceptions of 
the sacred: the presence of the herelnow (the immediacy advocated by 
"sudden" ChantZen), and the presencelabsence of the sacred divinity (im- 
plying some form of mediati~n).~%t any rate, it is clear that the notion 
of presence is not merely a Christian one, inspired by the eucharist and 
Byzantine icons; it is pre-Christian, or pagan-and nowadays eminently 
poetical. 
In his stimulating work, Freedberg asks, "Why do we ignore the evi- 
dence for the effectiveness and provocativeness of images?" (PI, p. 26). 
There is perhaps no need to dwell here on what is apparently the blind 
spot of traditional Buddhist art history as well. T. Griffith Foulk and Rob- 
ert H. Sharf have pointed out some of the inadequacies of the aesthetic 
approach in the case of ChanlZen portraiture, and, as already noted, re- 
cent Euro-American art history has become interested in the ritual "effec- 
tiveness" of images. Instead, I would like to explore what kind of 
possibilities arise when we consider icons as images of power-an expres-
sion that translates quite appropriately the Chinese term lingxiang (if 
48. Here is how Father Longobardo describes a drought that plagued the inhabitants 
of the Guangtong province: "So they gave up hope in the city gods, and for the occasion 
they brought in a celebrated monster from the country. Its name was Locu [read Luzu, the 
Sixth Patriarch, that is, Huineng]. They paraded it about, bowed before it and made offer- 
ings to it, but like its counterparts it remained deaf to their pleading. It was this occasion 
that gave rise to the saying, ' ~ o c u  is growing old"' ( ~ a t t h &  ~ i c c i i  China in the Sixteenth 
Century: The Journals of Matthew Ricci, 1583-1610, trans. Louis J. Gallagher [New York, 
19531, p. 425). 
49. On the Chan "rhetoric of immediacy" and the central role of mediation, see Faure, 
The Rhetorir of Immediacy. 
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perhaps less clearly its Japanese counterpart, reiz6)-and to discuss, as 
Freedberg and others have done for Western art, the possibility of a the- 
ory of response. This means attempting to free ourselves from the obses- 
sion with meaning (symbolism, iconology in the Panofskian sense) and 
form (style) in order to retrieve the affect, effectivity, and function of the 
icon.50 We need to go beyond the traditional concerns about the genesis 
of particular works of art; influences; attempts to retrieve historical or 
aesthetic categories (the sublime, and so forth); and, more generally, the 
privileging of "high" art. 
Because he deals with Western materials, Freedberg is concerned 
mainly with the extreme eroticism of images, a dimension that one might 
claim is less conspicuous in Buddhist or Asian images. Indeed, it seems 
more difficult to derive a "phenomenology of coprophilia and arousal" 
from the vast bulk of Buddhist sculpture-with the exception of some 
Tantric figures (PI, p. 20). Many scholars would probably argue that even 
in these cases the image should be seen as merely a symbolic expression 
of the philosophical "conjunction of opposites" and not as a realistic rep- 
resentation of carnal lust. Even if the point were granted, it is obviously 
clear that such dialectical images lend themselves to a multitude of inter- 
pretations. Likewise, even if repressed in terms of pictorial depiction, the 
development of a motif such as that of Guanyin as prostitute, an illustra- 
tion of this bodhisattva's vow to appear in the world to save beings over- 
come by desire, must have had a power of arousal that we no longer 
suspect. The same can be said of figures of goddesses like Benzaiten or 
Kichijciten, or of the representations of MaiijuSri, Shdtoku Taishi, and 
Kdbd Daishi as young boys (chigo).jl A similar example, in the Christian 
context, would be the popular image of the Virgin offering her breast to 
a sick monk. If this male fantasy was triggered by the monastic contem- 
plation of an icon, one might expect the same fantasies to have arisen 
from Buddhist monks' relations to Guanyin and other similar (male or 
female) figures. 
"Seeing comes before words," John Berger argues5' Yet our gaze is 
always already informed by words, discourse-discursive thought, a 
thinking whose course is dual, bifurcated. There is no need to further 
50. As ,Jean-Fran~oisLyotard puts it: "This is the way philosophers enter the stage of 
'criticism,' by way of this gap through which the work escapes being converted into mean- 
ing" (Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard, "Philosophy and Painting in the Age of Their Experimenta- 
tion: Contribution to an Idea of Postmodernity," trans. Miria Minich Brewer and Daniel 
Brewer, The Lyotard Reader, ed. Andrew Benjamin [Oxford, 19891, p. 182). 
51. For an "art historical" presentation of some of these boyish figures, without discus- 
sion of their power of sexual arousal, see Christine M. E. Guth, "The Divine Boy in Japanese 
Art," Monumenta Nipponica 42 (Spring 1987): 1-23. For a discussion of Buddhist pedophilia, 
see Faure, The Rhetoric ofImmediacy, pp. 248-57. For a discussion of the homoerotic tradition 
of Western humanism through the figure of Ganymede, see Leonard Barkan, Transuming 
Passion: Ganymede and the Erotics of Humanzsm (Stanford, Calif., 1991). 
52.John Berger, Ways ofseeing (1972; London, 1977), p. 7; hereafter abbreviated WS. 
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emphasize the importance of the gaze, not only in the Indo-Buddhist 
tradition, but also in the Western tradition. As the conscious gaze, pre- 
supposing spacing and differentiation, is always already mediated by dis- 
course, apparently no primacy of perception exists. Although words can 
never replace seeing, seeing is already informed through knowledge, dis- 
course, and words, and our discourse on Buddhist "art" is itself informed 
by several venerable traditions. 
Even when we attempt to break away from the traditional aesthetic 
approach to take into account the anthropological or cultic dimensions 
of the Buddhist icon, our predominant influence remains Western. What- 
ever its inadequacies, the study of the anthropological or cultic dimen- 
sions of Buddhist art appears as a prerequisite, an antidote to the 
dominant Orientalist and/or aesthetic approaches. As Heidegger puts it, 
"the works [of art] themselves stand and hang in collections and exhibi- 
tions. But are they here in themselves as the works they themselves are, 
or are they not rather here as objects of the art industry?53. . The whole 
art industry, even if carried to the extreme and exercised in every way 
for the sake of works themselves, extends only to the object-being of the 
works. But this does not constitute their work-being."54 Of course, there 
are also ambivalent cases, for instance in modern Japan, where icons are 
at the same time-although not for the same people-objects of collec- 
tion and of devotion, of aesthetic appreciation and of religious respect. 
If icons, in their ritual context, are essentially traps, devices for cap- 
turing power (ling), it is no wonder that the art historians, but also the 
artist-monks, like the gods of their iconology (or iconography), would be 
in turn trapped by their lure (what the French call a miroir aux a l o ~ e t t e s ) . ~ ~  
Our discussion of the nature of the icon should blur the opposition be- 
tween presentation and representation: both are always present, and in- 
terpretation is always to double business bound. And yet the icon is 
neither simply presence nor representation. 
We stand at the intersection of several strands (aesthetic, philosophi- 
cal, and cultic) of the Western and Asian traditions, which are themselves 
dual, insofar as they present iconic (or cultic) tendencies and iconoclastic 
rhetorics-a duality found most notably in ChanJZen Buddhism. Insofar 
as it acknowledges its debt to Asian and Western, Buddhist and Christian 
traditions, while attempting to intertwine them, my own discourse here 
is self-consciously and painfully hybrid. However, before weaving these 
various strands into a new pattern, I should try to disentangle the red 
thread that runs through each of them. 
53. The German Kunstbetrzeb could be translated, more literally, as "bustling act~vity 
around art." 
54. Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," Poetry, Language, Thought, 
trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York, 1971), pp. 40-41; hereafter abbreviated "OW." 
55. See Faure, Visions of Power, pp. 224-74. 
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In Christianity, the belief in the incarnation, while an attempt to 
make "the invisible visible," amounted to a destabilization of the visible, 
its opening into-or rather, its escaping, vanishing unto-another, still 
invisible, reality. The vanishing point in question, however, is not that of 
perspective. Although the manifestation of the Buddhas and bodhisatt- 
vas in this world is not the same thing as the incarnation of Christ, there 
is something to be learned from the history of Western images. I say 
"Western images," not "Western art,'' because the latter could be seen, at 
the risk of oversimplifying, as a forgetting of the incarnation of the invis- 
ible in the visible, just as Western philosophy, according to Heidegger, is 
a forgetting of the Greek notion of Being as "appearing" (Erscheinen).j6In 
the Buddhist context, an example of that paradoxical attempt to reveal 
the invisible is the wooden image of the Chinese thaumaturge Baozhi 
(418-514), in the Kyoto National Museum. The face of this icon splits 
open, like a dehiscing fruit, and another face, that of Dizang, the bodhi- 
sattva who was Baozhi's true nature, appears within (behind the mask). 
The story behind that image is also revealing: we are told that the artist 
who tried to represent Baozhi found it impossible to fix his features be- 
cause they changed constantly. 
Another symbolic expression of the excess that constitutes the unrep- 
resentable is the invisible u;?i;a or fleshy protuberance on the top of the 
Buddha's head. We are told that this us?i;a remains invisible because no 
one can look down on the Buddha. On the one hand, it is but one of the 
thirty-two signs that configure the Buddha's body, obfuscating it while 
revealing it. On the other hand, it is a paradoxical, formless sign that 
implies its own negat i~n.~ '  According to Stella Kramrisch, it constitutes 
"an extension of the body-like appearance of the Buddha beyond its an- 
thropomorphic limits" (EI, p. 131).j8 The us?i;a is the unseen top of the 
Buddha icon, symbolizing its nirguna, or unqualified aspect, the paradox- 
ical quality of the supramundane or transcendent Buddha. It is, as it 
were, the invisible top of a truncated column-like the one in Giorgione's 
Empesta, a comparison to which we will return. 
The point is this: something appears in the icon that is beyond repre- 
sentation, and this something projects the whole icon beyond representa- 
tion. It interrupts or doubles the convenient demarcations of aesthetic, 
artistic, symbolic, or art-market economies. The icon is at the same time 
here and there, bridging the gap between two realms and partaking of 
56. Heidegger, A n  Introduction to Metaflhysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, 
Conn., 1959), p. 98. 
57. Another practically invisible mark of the Buddha has caught the Buddhist imagi- 
nation: his hidden reproductive organ; his sheathed, as it were, "invaginated" penis, which 
is often compared to that of a horse or an elephant. 
58. In ChaniZen, the term ~ n G a(in Chinese, dingxiang; in Japanese, chznzb) came to 
designate the portrait of an enlightened abbot. On this question, see Foulk and Sharf, "On 
the Ritual Use of Ch'an Portraiture in Medieval China," pp. 202-6. 
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both. To begin to understand this paradoxical presence or visuality, we 
need to expand our visual field to include in it other realities, such as 
dreams, visions, relics, and rituals. In this sense, images (unlike art) be- 
long to the field of anthropological history and no longer to art history 
alone. Here Georges Didi-Huberman's notion of the visual (as opposed 
to the merely visible) proves heuristically useful. According to Didi- 
Huberman, 
there is no image that can be thought radically except beyond the 
principle of visibility, that is, beyond the canonical opposition- 
spontaneous, unthought-between the visible and the invisible. This 
beyond will still have to be called visual, as that which will always 
come to create a flaw in the disposition of seeing subjects to reestab- 
lish the continuity of their descriptive recognition or of their certi- 
tude with respect to what they see.59 
The visual is what, in the visible, modifies it and gives it its character of 
sacred event, what connects metonymic figures of the double like icons, 
relics, and dreams. 
In their attempt to move away from discussions about the sublimity 
of art, art historians have tended to focus on works of art as "deposit[s] 
of a social relationship" or "fossils of economic life."60 Alternatively, they 
have focussed on symbolism (Panofsky's iconology) or on techniques of 
production. Recent scholarship has explored, for instance, the technical 
aspects of the manufactured object-what Heidegger described as the 
artisanal element of the work of art. Heidegger warns us that "the much- 
vaunted aesthetic experience cannot get around the thingly aspect of the 
art work," but at the same time he wants to retrieve what, apart from 
materiality, defines the work of art ("OW," p. 19).However, when the fo- 
cus is on the object (as "thing" or as "work"), there is a danger of missing 
or minimizing the response of the subject (the beholder). Even when the 
emphasis is on the response to art, this approach does not always suffi- 
ciently address the nonaesthetic effects that images may have on the 
beholder, and, in particular, the performative function they have in a 
I1 n'y a d'image P penser radicalement qu'au-dela du principe de visibilitk, c'est a 
dire au-deli de l'opposition canonique-spontanke, impenske-du visible et de l'in- 
visible. Cet au-deli, il faudra encore le nommer visuel, comme ce qui viendrait tou- 
jours faire dkfaut a la disposition du sujet qui voit pour rttablir la continuit6 de sa 
reconnaissance descriptive ou de sa certitude quant a ce qu'il voit. [Didi-Huberman, 
Ce que n o w  voyons, re quz nous regarde, p. 761 
See also Didi-Huberman, Devant l'image. 
60. Michael Baxandall, Painting and Experience i n  Fijteenth-Century Italy: A Priiner i n  the 
Social History of Pictorial Style (Oxford, 1972), pp. 1, 2. 
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ritual context. If, following Kramrisch's discussion of the Buddha's bodily 
marks, we admit that the usnqa stands for the sublime or for transcen- 
dence, whereas the web symbolism on the Buddha's body stands for im- 
manence, the inscription of the icon in multiple symbolic networks, then 
one could argue that the gaze of the icon, but also its touch, usually forgot- 
ten in these discussions, establish another type of communication-of 
relationship-between the icon and its beholder (its would-be holder, but 
also its beheld and beholden believer). Some of these icons, like those of 
Binzuru (that is, Pindola, an arhat famous for his magical powers) are 
called in Japan nude-botoke ("Buddha to stroke"). Others are kept, on the 
contrary, off-limits, because they are too powerful; they tend to get out of 
hand, or cannot be touched without harm. It is often one of their lesser 
manifestations that is offered to the touch or gaze of worshippers. 
We need therefore to look again at traditional themes of Buddhist 
art, such as the vexed question of iconism and aniconism, the iconoclastic 
rhetoric of Chan, the double and the symbol, and ritual efficacy. The icon 
(and, more broadly, the symbol) permits an articulation between different 
symbolic orders (the stupa, the human body, the social body, the cosmos). 
Such an articulation is not, however, a pure equivalence because these 
various orders remain clearly distinct; the family resemblance between 
various symbolic artifacts should not be construed as an identity. There 
is a constant danger of hermeneutic overkill: an icon is not a mummy, 
which is not a living being. Yet something circulates from one to the other, 
a circulation permitted by a certain isomorphism, isotopy, mimesis, 
and functional equivalence between these figures of the double. There 
is no identification, at least as long as a clear sense of boundaries, what 
Nietszche would have called an Apollinian sense, prevails-but this sense 
is at times erased, during crepuscular moments of Dionysian high tide, 
the time of ritual when all sacred cows and all cats turn grey. 
When we try to retrieve this dialectical dimension, how can we avoid 
the double pitfall of formalism and historicism? Iconological interpreta- 
tion, despite (or because of) its sophistication, tends to hermeneutic over- 
kill. At any rate, trying to understand the symbolic motivation of the artist 
is not sufficient, because, as Dan Sperber has pointed out, this motivation 
is itself ~ymbolical.~' We need to go beyond a purely semiological reading, 
or beyond reading as such, that is, beyond interpreting the image as a 
message, a symbol (in the traditional sense). Only then can we under- 
stand the symbol (in the etymological sense of "throwing together"). This 
long detour from one type of symbol to another only has the appearance 
of a tautology, of a vicious, or, if you prefer, hermeneutic, circle. Actually, 
it is not so much a circle as a recycling of old ideas, putting them to 
new use. This whole discussion may seem rather obvious to postmodern 
61. See Dan Sperber, Rethinking Symbolism,trans. Alice L. Morton (Cambridge, 1975), 
p. 33. 
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historians, but Buddhist art history still has a long way to go before earn- 
ing the dividends (and enjoying the divisiveness) of postmodernity. 
For this bricolage, we find in the toolbox of Western art criticism, be- 
yond a traditional aesthetic criticism of a rather descriptive vein, various 
recent theoretical attempts at "thinking through" the icon with concepts 
such as the .  fetish (Marx); the aura (Benjamin); the visual (Didi-
Huberman); the parergon (Derrida); the effigy (Louis Marin, Jean-Pierre 
Vernant); or the symbol, perceived, in the words of Jean-Joseph Goux, as 
a concrete union between the finite and the infinite.62 Paradoxically, we 
might also try to retrieve some submerged or peripheral intuitions of 
Kantian or Hegelian aesthetics (most notably the Kantian discussion of 
the sublime and the colossal) or take our cues from Baudelaire, who 
wrote: "Praise the cult of images (my great, my unique, my primitive pas- sion).flti+But this means that we attempt to divert these concepts from 
their classic use, to subvert them by dislocating and relocating them, not 
that we simply yield to the grandiloquence of sublime aesthetics. To us, 
sublime resonates with sublimation and with subliminal. 
In his analysis of Eisenstein's film images, next to (or rather beyond) 
their semiotic and symbolic meanings Roland Barthes distinguishes a 
"third meaning" (playing on the polysemy of the French word sens: 
"meaning," "signification," but also "sense," and "d i re~ t ion" ) .~~  He returns 
to this theme, in regard to music, with his notion of the grain of the 
voice: "Through music, we understand better the Text as significance [as 
opposed to mere 'signifi~ation']."~~ If so, through what medium can we 
understand better the "image as significance"? Significantly, this "third 
meaning" is qualified as obtuse (as opposed to obvious). What I am trying 
to retrieve in Buddhist icons seems akin to what Barthes calls the obtuse 
meaning, only it is no longer a meaning, strictly speaking, but rather 
an elusiiie reality, perhaps akin to the perlocutionary aspect of language 
according to Austin, or to what in Indian aesthetics is called the indirect 
(paroksa) and in Buddhism "twilight lang~age."~" 
62. Jean-Joseph Goux, Symbolic Economzes: After Marx and Freud, trans. Jennifer Curtiss 
Gage (Ithaca, N.Y, 1990), p. 67. See also Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Econoiny, 
trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling, ed. Friedrich Engels, 3 vols. (New York, 1967); "U'A"; Der-
rida, The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago, 1987), chap. 
1, hereafter abbreviated TP; Louis Marin, The Portrait of the King, trans. Martha Houle (Min- 
neapolis, 1988); and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Mythand Thought ainong the Greeks (London, 1983). 
63. "Glorifier le culte des images (ma grande, mon unique, ma primitive passion)" 
(Charles Baudelaire, "My Heart Laid Bare," "My Heart Laid Bare" and Other Prose writing^, 
trans. Norman Cameron, ed. Peter Quennell [New York, 19751, p. 198). 
64. Barthes, "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives," pp. 43-58. 
65. Ibid., p. 277. 
66. See J .  L. .4ustin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). On the 
indirect, see <:oomaraswamy, The Transformation of Nature in Art, pp. 121-38; on "twilight 
language," see Roderick S. Bucknell and Martin Stuart-Fox, The Tu~ilight Language: Explora- 
tzons zn Buddhist Medztation and Symbolism (New York, 1986). 
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The Stupendous Icon 
Fenollosa saw the introduction of Buddhism to China as a "stupen- 
dous revolution" in Asian art (EC, 1:28). Let me indulge in an etymologi- 
cal fantasy and derive stupendous from stupa (as colossal derives from 
kolossos, an erected stone). One could argue that Buddhist art begins with 
a stupa, a funerary monument usually seen as a symbol of death but that 
is also a symbol of life and fertility. As is well known, the stupa gave birth 
to the Chinese pagoda (a term said to derive from dagoba, a contraction 
of dhdtu garbha, "womb of the relic"). According to Hegel, the origin of 
the Indian icon is to be found in the linga, a column that resembles the 
ovoid or seamless stupa (an egg-shaped monument, distinct from the five- 
degree stupa) of Japanese B ~ d d h i s m . ~ ~  This phallic column is soon orna- 
mented with images emptied and hollowed out by these supplements. 
Asian art thus evolves from the column; the linga is emptied to produce 
icons. Speaking of the culture of Angkor, Georges Coedits writes: "The 
essence of kingship was supposed to reside in a lings ensconced in a pyra- 
mid in the center of the royal city, itself supposed to be at the ideal center 
of the world. The cult of the god-king was first introduced in the ninth 
century. Later, with the introduction of Buddhism, the god-king became 
an image of the king as Buddha."" The truncated column, like Mount 
Sumeru, the cosmic pillar whose upper part vanishes into the thin air of 
higher realms, is therefore the image or symbol of the symbol itself. Like- 
wise, the portrait (chinzo) of a ChantZen master, a variant of the Buddha 
icon, is a truncated column, whose top (u;l;lr;a, the skull protuberance, 
translated as chinzd) is invisible. Needless to say, I do not have in mind 
here an evolutionary conception of art like that of Hegel. I merely want 
to suggest that there may be more than meets the eye in this Hegelian 
column. This emphasis on phallic imagery should not be read too quickly 
as standard phallocentrism, since the column is also a crypt. Its hol- 
lowness and the womb symbolism that accompanies it deflate its apparent 
turgescence, or at least belie its gender sy rnb~l i sm.~~  Segalen, too, saw the 
origin of Chinese statuary in the column and the stele. Stupas and steles 
are perhaps the Asian counterparts of the Greek kolossos. 
The Hegelian conception of the column/linga and its relation to im- 
ages recalls, mutatis mutandis, Kramrisch's description of the Hindu 
temple or Paul Mus's discussion of the Buddhist stupa. One can say of 
67. Whereas the five-degree or "five-wheel" stupa symbolizes the five elements of the 
Buddhist cosmos, the ovoid or seamless stupa represents the pre- or postcosmic stage, the 
stage of indifferentiation and chaos before the emergence of the symbolic. 
68. Coedks, Pour ~nieux  comprendre Angkor, p. 62. 
69. On the symbolism ofturgescence a i d  the "phallic effect that is not necessarily 
specific to the male," see Derrida, "Foi et savoir: Les Deux Sources de la 'religion' aux limites 
de la simple raison," in La Religion, ed. Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (Paris, 1996), p. 63. 
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the Buddhist stupa and its relics what Kramrisch says of the Indian tem- 
ple and its image-"the symbol or image occupies the center of the sanc- 
tuary and is known as the jiva, the 'life' of the temple in which it 
dwells. . . . The walls are its body" (EI, p. 253). While the center is un- 
changing, undifferentiated, like the immutable essence (purusa), the pe- 
riphery is differentiated in its images, and changing, like matter (prak?.ti). 
We must, at least, distinguish between the static image at the center and 
its mobile counterparts at the periphery as they are seen in the ritual 
process, the hermeneutical circle of circumambulation. Thus, the stupa 
is, in more than one sense, an animated monument, not only because of 
the presence of relics that give it life but because of the procession of 
pilgrims that turns it into what Mus called a "cinetic" monument.70 The 
centerlperiphery, or insideloutside pattern overlaps with the nirgul;la/sar- 
gul;la, or formlesslwith form paradigm. This paradigm is played out in a 
variety of ways in Hinduism and East Asian Buddhism: it informs, for 
instance, the distinction between the seamless or ovoid stupa and the five- 
degree stupa in Japanese Buddhism. 
In China, the mummies of Buddhist priests, first encrypted under 
the funerary stupa, eventually were placed in chambers at the entrance 
of the stupa, where they could reveal themselves on occasion to the be- 
mused gaze of the worshippers-like the Buddha Prabhfitaratna in the 
Lotus Szitra, appearing in midair within his stupa. One case in point is that 
of the mummy of the fourth Chan patriarch, Daoxin: the gates of his 
stupa opened by themselves, revealing his intact body in its eerie splen- 
dor, and no one afterwards dared to close them. I have examined else- 
where the process of iconization that brought these mummies out of their 
crypts into the "Image Halls" of Chan monasteries." 
We might pursue these philosophical musings on the columnlstupa 
by turning to Kant's conception of the sublime as a truncated column, 
and to Derrida's analysis of the Kantian sublime in terms of the colossal 
and the parergon. The question of taille, size, is also that of taille, cutting, 
engraving. The French word taille derives from tailler ("to cut," "to en- 
grave," "to carve"), hence the height of the human body (used by image 
carvers). Unfortunately, the English language does not allow us to follow 
Derrida in his wordplay on the limit that simultaneously delimits and 
"illimits." A "detail" (de'tail, or de'taille)-like the visible/invisible usl;li+a- 
means "the movement from cise [taille], which is always small or mea- 
sured, to the disproportion of the without-cise [sans-taille], the immense. 
The dimension of the effigy, the effigy itself would have the fictional effect 
of demeasuring. It would de-cize [elle de'tailleraiq, would liberate the ex- 
70. Mus, "Civilisations d'ExtrCme-Orient," Annuazre d u  College de France 54 (1 954): 238. 
71. See Faure, The Rhetoric oflnzinediacy, pp. 148-78; see also Sharf, "The Idolization 
of Enlightenment." 
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cess of cise" ( T e  p. l2l)." As Kramrisch points out, the Buddha image is 
always a cut above the human beings it seems to reproduce, and this ex- 
cess (dimesure) is in a sense the effect of its u;l;li;a (see EI, pp. 130-40). 
Recall, too, that this term came to designate the portraits of ChanIZen 
masters. 
The logic of representation permitted by the icon is supplemented 
(in the Derridean sense, that is, also subverted) by the logic of impregna- 
tion that comes with the olfactive perception of incense.73 Do mummies 
and icons have a ~mel l?~ '  They probably do, and this may explain why 
they are usually sealed with lacquer or gold. It may be worth mentioning 
here the case of the Central Asian thaumaturge Sengqie (d. 7 lo), whose 
posthumous refusal to be enshrined in the capital-far from his commu- 
nity in Sizhou-was manifested in his corpse's stench.75 The mummy of 
the Chan master Wuliao (787-869) is another similar example, in which 
the stinking icon, the mummy, resists representation, resists commodity 
fetishism-even on the part of an E m p e r ~ r . ~ ~  The icon fights back. The 
smell of the icon, whether stink or fragrance, is another excess, a sign of 
transcendence that can easily go unrecognized. 
In this context, we may recall that the first Buddhist icons in Japan 
were made out of aromatic camphorwood (kusu), a particularly sacred 
wood, although especially difficult to carve. A good example is the Mir- 
oku image of Chiigiiji, the first known instance of the assembled wood- 
72. The translators of The Truth in Painting explain as follows their choice of cise for 
taille: "To render this second sense of the French taille, and to preserve the uncertainty 
between the two senses which is vital in some of what follows, we shall use the word 'cise,' 
an obsolete spelling of 'size' . . . and suggestive of cutting (cf. incision)" (TI: p. 120). 
73. See Jean-Pierre Albert, Odeurs de sainteti: La Mythologie chritienne des aromates (Paris, 
1990), p. 232. 
74. This question was raised by Janet Gyatso in her discussion of my book, The Rhetoric 
of Immediacy, and I owe this insight (or afterthought) to her. On the smell of death in art, 
see Mieke Bal, "Dead Flesh, or the Smell of Painting," in Visual Culture, pp. 365-83. 
75. See, for example, this account in Fozu tongi (General Records of the Buddhas and 
Patriarchs): "When master Sengqie died, a royal decree ordered that his body should be 
lacquered and that a stupa should also be erected at the Jianfu Monastery. Soon after this, 
a fob smell pervaded the city. An edict ordered the body t i  be sent to [his former monastery 
at] Sizhou. At once, a fragrant breeze blew over the imperial capital" (Zhipan, Fozu tongi in 
Taishd shinshu daizflkyd, 49:372). 
76. See the entry for UTuliao in the Fozu tong'i: 
Twenty years after its completion, [Wuliao's stupa] . . . fell down owing to a flood in 
a hill stream. His disciples then saw that the corpse had suffered no physical deterio- 
ration. When the prince of the Min State heard this news, he sent a messenger and 
took the corpse to his house to worship. Immediately a bad smell came out of the 
corpse. After the prince had offered some incense and prayed, and it had been reen- 
shrined at the original place at Guiyang, a fragrant smell came out soon after its 
restoration. So all the people of that city went out and paid homage to that stupa. 
[Ibid., 49:389] 
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block technique (yosegi zukuri). It has been argued that camphorwood was 
the Japanese equivalent for sandalwood, out of which was carved the first 
icon of the Buddha. But, unlike sandalwood icons, camphorwood icons 
were usually painted, which tends to cover the fragrance. The Yumedono 
Kannon, for instance, is carved out of camphorwood. The fragrance of 
these icons may be seen as a reflection of the natural fragrance of the 
Buddha's body, but it may also be a way to cover the lingering stink of 
death in icons that were perceived as mummies or as anthropomorphic 
tombs containing relics. 
The Logic of the Essera 
As Derrida has shown in his discussion of the parergon, the icon 
lends itself to deconstruction. It is both disjunctive and conjunctive, or, 
better, it itself operates the disjunction between disjunction and conjunc- 
tion: the disjunction between, precisely, iconophilia and iconoclasm. Be- 
cause of the appearance of the icon, two strategies become possible, or, 
rather, two poles are produced, with a number of intermediary strategies. 
The icon is also conjunctive, like the ritual centered on it, joining and 
separating the two spheres of the profane and the sacred, providing the 
ontological cut (la taille, "cise") and the scar. Derrida again: 
Thus all this goes on around an infinite but truncated column, at the 
limit of the trunk, at the place of the truncation or the cutting edge, 
on the borderline, fine as a blade, which defines the cise. The ques- 
tion opens around knowing whether one must think a sublimity of 
the soul from one edge or the other, of the infinite or the finite, it 
being understood that the two are not opposed to each other but 
that each transgresses itself toward the other, the one in the other. 
[Tep. 13415' 
I argued above for the need to go beyond traditional iconology, that 
is, beyond an approach that reads images as symbols. In apparent self- 
contradiction, I want now to argue for considering the icon as a symbol, 
but a symbol in a different, etymological sense. Referring to John Skor- 
upski's notion of the symbol as something that "in some sense is or partici- 
pates in the reality it represents," Freedberg asks rhetorically, "If we speak 
thus of identity, what need for the notion of the image or object as sym- 
77. See also the following: "This double trait of a cise which limits and unlimits at one 
and the same time, the divided line upon which a colossus comes to cise itself, incise itself 
without cise, is the sublime"; "the colossal is, in other words superelevates itself, on both 
sides of its own cise, it is on both sides its own cise, it is of its own cize on both sides. Apriorz 
and from the start double colossus, if not double column. Whence its resonance" (T f :pp. 
144, 145). 
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bol?" (PI, p. 277). None, of course, unless we use the word symbol in its 
etymological sense of the identity and complementarity of tallies (dou- 
bles)-what I call the logic of the tes~era. '~ This logic of the symbol, or of 
the tessera, lends itself to duplication, that is, to the production or even 
the profusion of doubles. The duplication process is not simply the result 
of new techniques of production (icons constructed from many prefab 
pieces, versus one-piece icons, carved from a single block of wood or 
stone), although technical factors clearly played an important part in it.j9 
The Chinese tessera ( fu)  was a bamboo tab or tablet divided longitu- 
dinally into two parts to serve as testimony in a contract. The term means, 
variously, a seal divided in two parts; to concord, to adjust, to respond 
mutually, to fit, or to conform; or a good omen, a charm (writing or draw- 
ing), an amulet, or a talisman. The compound fuhao denotes a symbol, a 
mark, a sign. Robert Des Rotours notes that these insignias or double 
contracts were of universal use. In France, they were called tailles because 
of the incision made on the two juxtaposed sticks; this is the origin of the 
English word tally.80 
According to the Shuowen dictionary, "the f u  is what gives proof [ce 
qui fait foil. In the Han regulations, one divides a six-inch-long piece of 
bamboo in order to join its two parts." The Cihai also defines fuxin as 
follows: "What is in the genre of insignia or tablets in two parts (fuqi) is 
also called fuxin, which means insignia used as proof [wei]." The word xin, 
which means "faith," or "worthy of faith," also means "seal," or "te~sera."~' 
The Ciyuan has the following about fu: "A bamboo [tablet] on which char- 
acters were written; one divided this tablet into two parts, each person 
78. After writing this, I came across a reference to the tessera in Michael Ann Holly's 
recent essay on WolWin. She writes: "The corpus of WolWin's work can be read according 
to the trope of tessera coined by Harold Bloom to explain the 'anxiety of influence' often 
'suffered' by poets" (Michael Ann Holly, "Wolfflin and the Imagining of the Baroque," in 
Visual Culture, p. 351). And: "In Bloom's terms, Burckhardt's Renaissance provided the tes-
serae for Wolfflin's baroque" (ibid., p. 362). Here is Bloom's definition of the tessera: "I take 
the word not from mosaic-making, where it is still used, but from the ancient mystery cults, 
where it meant a token of recognition, the fragment say of a small pot with which the other 
fragments would reconstitute the vessel" (Bloom, The Anxiety of Injuence: A Theory of Poetry 
[Oxford, 19731, p. 14).Yielding to the anxiety of influence, I add this fragment to my little 
vessel, although it may belong to another larger and more artistic one. 
79. I owe this information to Mimi Yiengpruksawan. 
80. See Robert Des Rotours, "Insignes en deux parties (fou)sous la dynastie des T'ang 
(618-907)," T'oung Pao 41 (1952): 34. See also the standard definition of the substantive 
tally, which includes the meanings "a reckoning or score"; "a stick on which notches are 
made to keep a count or score" or "a stick on which notches were formerly made to keep a 
record of amounts paid or owed"; "a mark used in recording a number of acts or objects, 
most often in series of five, consisting of four vertical lines canceled diagonally or horizon- 
tally by a fifth line"; and "something that is very similar or corresponds to something else; 
a double or counterpart." 
81. Significantly, the same term was used in ChanIZen for the definition of the patriar- 
chal robe, which was the main emblem of transmission. 
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kept one half. One reunited these two parts when one wanted to prove 
one's sincerity. Sometimes these were made of wood, jade or metal."82 Ac- 
cording to the Cihai dictionary, f u  also has the meanings "good omen" 
and "amulet." It can in some cases play the role of a talisman. These 
insignia were used in a lot of administrative and judicial functions from 
the Han dynasty o n ~ a r d . ~ : '  A synonym is qi, a tablet used for a contract, 
generally written on and divided into two parts. According to the Shuo-
wen, a qi is a large contract. The Cihai defines it as a contract or a diploma 
in two parts. The word derives from the Chinese for incise, engrave, hence 
it signifies also an incision (taille).84These etymologies call to mind the 
old Chinese saying, "To incise the boat at the place where the sword fell 
in the waterv-which is perhaps a nice metaphor for what we are trying 
to do when we judge Buddhist icons by modern standards, whether those 
of art history or of anthropology. 
On the Western side, we use the term symbol, derived from sumbolos 
(and sumballein, "to throw together") (see, for instance, "OW," p. 20). An 
equivalent term is token, a piece of stamped metal used as substitute for 
currency-therefore halfway between false and real money. What affects 
the prototype of the image during the ritual also affects the beholder- 
by the same token, because they have the same token, the same "counter." 
The response (ying) of the deity is the counterpart of the response of the 
follower. Ultimately, the Chinese symbol is not simply a juxtaposition of 
two tallies; it is a union, a hierogamy-which implies an exchange of sub- 
stance, a twofold movement, upward and downward. The logic of this 
kind of symbol is not simply metaphoric but also metonymic. 
Icons can be used as material objects of worship or as mental aids 
for meditation through visualization. However, the distinction is by no 
means clear-cut: visual icons, just like material ones, are essentially "traps 
for power," and they function as substitute bodies. This power can at 
times be nefarious, as with the straw dogs of Chinese antiquity, ritual 
82. Des Rotours, "Insignes en deux parties Cfou)sous la dynastie des T'ang (618-907)," 
p. 5 .  
83. Before the E n g ,  they had the shape of a tiger; during the Tang, usually that of a 
fish, sometimes of a tortoise. Until the Tang, the inscription was written on the edge, before 
the insignia was slit; later it was written on each side of the fault line; finally it was written 
inside the insignia, while the characters hetong, engraved on the edge, are split in the middle 
and must be reconstituted when the two parts of the insignia are reunited. In some cases, 
the inscription inside, reading tong ("same"), carved in relief (jang) on one side, must also 
fit together with the text carved en creux (yin) on the other side. So one part of the fu was 
kept inside the palace, the other (or others, for there were sometimes as many as twenty) 
were distributed to functionaries, who were sent to the provinces. After the Song, they were 
replaced by tablets (paii-but their symbolic value (in both senses) remained. 
84. Among the various meanings for qz we find "pact, contract, convention; to carve, 
to incise; to concord, to match, to agree." This term is also used to designate awakening- 
tallying with truth-and Chan transmission-tallying between master and disciple, be- 
tween mind and mind. 
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scapegoats that were ritually destroyed; or the Japanese dolls that are 
given to the custody of temples (like the Ningy6-dera, "Doll Temple," in 
Kyoto). The same is true of mental images of demonic powers, which are 
summoned by the practitioner to be eliminated through incantations or 
imaginary battles. 
In traditional Buddhist practice, the meditator must visualize the 
physical attributes of a Buddha to obtain the "samddhi [mental absorption] 
of the one who stands (avasthita) face-to-face with or in the presence of 
(sammukha), the present. . . B u d d h a ~ . " ~ ~One of the sixteen ways to obtain 
this sum-dhi is by having an icon of the Buddha made, or 'Ijust having a 
picture painted."86 One of the raisons d'itre of the first image of the Bud- 
dha was to aid contemplation during the time when the Buddha would 
no longer be on earth, and looking at it is said to be "no different from 
looking at the Buddha's [actual] body." Significantly, among such visual 
aids, Chinese Buddhists included paintings of landscapes. Stein has 
shown that the miniature landscape, perceived as a microcosm, consti- 
tutes a kind of tally. This world in miniature is said to call the powers of 
the macrocosm, which flow into it, fusing with it. Like the icon, the bonsai 
is a trap for power; it was used in particular by the Daoist ascetics to 
increase their longe~ity.~' Originally, as Delahaye has shown, landscape 
painting had a talismanic value not so different from that of the Daoist 
"sacred maps." This explains why these paintings, despite secularization, 
have remained "compelling images" in the hands (and eyes) of the literati, 
a facet of aestheticism that would probably surprise many connoisseurs 
of Chinese art.8" 
The Aura of the Icon 
An analysis of Buddhist icons would not be complete without a dis- 
cussion of Benjamin's seminal notion of the aura of the work of art.89 Such 
a reference is not merely a nod in the direction of modern art criticism; 
indeed, this notion turns out to be quite useful in defining the obtuse 
85. Paul M. Harrison, "Buddhanusmyti in the Pratyutpanna-Buddha-Sammukh&asthita-
Samddhi-Szitra," Journal of Indian Philosophy 6 (Sept. 1978): 42. See also Miranda Shaw, "Bud- 
dhist and Taoist Influences on Chinese Landscape Painting," Journal of the History of Ideas 49 
(Apr.-June 1988): 196. 
86. Harrison, "Buddhanusmyti in the Pratjutpanna-Buddha-Sammukhdvasthita-Sadhi-
Szitra," p. 39. 
87. See Rolf A. Stein, The World zn Miniature,. Container Gardens and Dwellings in Far East- 
ern Religious Thought, trans. Phyllis Brooks (Stanford, Calif., 1990), pp. 5-48. 
88. See also Delahaye, Les Premieres Peintures depaysage en Chine: Aspects religzeux (Paris, 
198 l), and James Cahill, The Compelling Image: Nature and Style in Seventeenth-Century Chinese 
Painting (Cambridge, Mass., 1982). 
89. Aura-"souffle"-is not, like aureole, derived from aureus, "golden [crown]." 
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presence of the icon. In "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Re- 
production" (1936), which appeared the year after Mus published Bara-
budur, Benjamin defines the aura of natural objects as "the unique 
phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be" ("WA," p. 222). This 
notion is then extended to cultural (and cultic) productions. In a foot- 
note, Benjamin adds: 
The definition of the aura as a "unique phenomenon of a distance 
however close it may be" represents nothing but the formulation of 
the cult value of the work of art in categories of space and time per- 
ception. Distance is the opposite of closeness. The essentially distant 
object is the unapproachable one. Unapproachability is indeed a ma- 
jor quality of the cult image. True to its nature, it remains "distant, 
however close it may be." ["WA," p. 243 n. 51 
The distance is equated, paradoxically, with presence through another 
definition, albeit a negative one: "Even the most perfect reproduction of 
a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its 
unique existence at the place where it happens to be. . . . One might sub- 
sume the eliminated element in the term 'aura' and go on to say: that 
which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the 
work of art" ("WA," pp. 220-21). Benjamin comments on the intrinsic 
violence of modern perception, arguing that "to pry an object from its 
shell, to destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception whose 'sense of the 
universal equality of things' has increased to such a degree that it extracts 
it even from a unique object by means of reproduction" ("WA," p. 223).90 
The aura of Buddhist icons has to do with the deposit of relics within 
them and their ritual consecration: the term aura means "breath," and 
the consecration is an "installation of the breaths" (pranapratistha). In 
some cases, this aura also has to do with the beliefs in the divine power 
of the material element, stone or wood, as in the ichiboku (one-piece) 
90. Perhaps owing to Brechtian influence, Benjamin is nevertheless ambivalent about 
this evolution, which he also saw as a sign of democratization, of the legitimate ambition of 
the "masses" to overcome cultural privileges: "Every day the urge grows stronger to get 
hold of an object at very close range by way of its likeness, its reproduction" ("WA," p. 223). 
The desacralization of the work of art was also for him an emancipation from its "parasitic" 
existence as an element of ritual ("WA," p. 224). In an earlier essay on photography, Benja- 
min attributed the aura to the technical conditions of photography. The nihilism of "The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" is also contradicted by his later essay, 
"On Some Motifs in Baudelaire." On this question, see Rainer Rochlitz, Le Dlsenchantement 
de l'art: La Phzlosophie de Walter Benjamin (Paris, 1992), pp. 174-94, trans. Jane Marie Todd, 
under the title The Disenchantment of Art: The Philosophy of Walter Benjamin (New York, 1996); 
and Mitchell, Iconology, pp. 178-85. For a positive conception of mimesis and reproduction, 
see also Michael Taussig, Mimeszs and Alten'ty: A Particular Hzstory of the Senses (New York, 
1993). 
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sculpture in Japan: "The god in the unworked stone or stock continues 
to reside in the worked stone or stock."g1 This is also true, for instance, of 
the "miraculous" logs, found in many legends. In other cases, the wood 
is empowered during consecration ceremonies that take place once carv- 
ing is initiated.g2 Finally, the aura is often explained as resulting from an 
unbroken line of mimesis and contact between the first icon and its later 
reproductions-the power of this first icon, the Udayana image, itself 
owing to its resemblance to and contact with the Buddha himself. The 
importance of the initial view of the Buddha can also be explained in 
terms of verisimilitude. This is also true for the Chinese representations 
of the eighteen arhats, whose prototype was initially seen by the poet- 
monk Guanxiu in a dream. In all cases, the existence of a direct link, 
historical or metaphysical, with the ultramundane prototype is essential 
in order for it to become present in the icon-hence the critical role of 
textual iconographies as a source of models. Just as the Vera eikon was 
imbued with the power of Christ through the impression of his face, the 
efficacy of Buddhist icons derives from their initial contact with the Bud- 
dha. This contact, however, does not have to be with the Buddha in the 
flesh, since his body was already, in a sense, merely an icon or a trace, an 
embodiment of the truth or dharma. Other traces or substitute bodies 
may have a similar effect. The Buddhist tradition seems to have hesitated 
between two models, one that insists on the superior value of the original 
or historical Buddha, and another that, in an almost Derridean fashion, 
undermines that foundation with its emphasis on the notion of traces. 
After the death of the Buddha, the sacred places where his paradigmatic 
life had unfolded and where his stupas remained came to play a similar 
role in the production of presence. 
To what extent, then, does the reproduction affect the effectiveness 
of the image? Is not the materialization of a halo or aureole around the 
head or body of Buddhist statues already a sign of their loss of the true 
aura (in the Benjaminian sense)? More to the point, the Benjaminian 
notion of a loss of aura through photographic reproduction may have 
serious implications for the historian of Asian religions. As any field- 
worker knows, there is a clear sense of profanation when taking photos 
in a cultic context; often the native objection against photos is that they 
will diminish the "efficacy" (ling), or what we may as well call the aura, of 
the icon. I recall a Japanese Buddhist monk who, when I asked him if I 
could take a picture of a particularly powerful icon, argued that the im- 
91. See Christine Guth Kanda, Shinzd: Hachimn Imagery and Its Development (Cam- 
bridge, Mass., 1985), p. 73: "The sheer bulk and lack of mobility either in pose or in the 
articulation of bodily mass gives them aprimeval aura" (my italics). 
92. See Yiengpruksawan, "Gods in Pieces: The Ontological Ramifications of the 
Joined-Wood Technique in Japanese Buddhist Statuary" (forthcoming). 
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age would not imprint on my film. We are clearly the descendants of our 
Orientalist fathers in this and other respects: although we no longer steal 
and behead statues (at least most of us), who does not have in his or her 
possession Buddhist icons (in one form or another) whose provenance 
will remain conveniently vague? 
In modern society, Berger comments, "works of art are discussed and 
presented as though they were holy relics" (WS, p. 21). He disapproves 
of such fetishism. But one might want to see works of art truly treated as 
relics, precisely because relics were not the object of the kind of "bogus 
religiosity" that "has become the substitute for what paintings lost when 
the camera made them reproducible" (WS, pp. 21, 23). If this "bogus 
religiosity" is nostalgic, so is its critique. Berger, in fact, shows that photo- 
graphic reproduction is responsible for a recrudescence of the nostalgia 
for the aura. What exactly distinguishes this "bogus religiosity" from Ben- 
jamin's authentic religiosity is not always clear, even if the new kind of 
impressive, mysterious aura no longer pervades the artwork "because of 
what it shows- . . . because of the meaning of its image," but "because 
of its market value" (WS, p. 23). 
The standardized production of icons in Japan after the eleventh 
century already resulted in a kind of commodity fetishism. As Christine 
Guth writes of the earlier period: "In preserving the cylindrical mass of 
the log from which an image is carved, Japanese sculpture of this period 
has an inner life and immediacy-qualities lost in later images of the 
joined-wood type."Y3 Clearly the shift from one-piece to prefab icons 
marks a watershed in icon production (and perhaps in icon reception). 
It does not mean that the cultic value has disappeared, although it might 
indeed have weakened, but the dissemination of power or sacrality (ling) 
is what justifies the multiplication of icons in the first place. Depending 
on circumstances, this dissemination can reflect (or produce) both an in- 
crease and a decrease in belief. The weakening of the icon's power, or 
rather the alternation between belief and disbelief that characterizes the 
icon as a dialectical image, is well illustrated by the story of the future 
shogun Yoritomo carrying a figurine of Kannon on his headdress, yet 
simultaneously not wanting it to be found by his enemies for fear of ridi- 
cule. In medieval Japanese Buddhism, as in the contemporary Thai case 
described by Stanley Tambiah, we find a massive production of amulets, 
but these amulets are charged by the monks, imbued with power.g4 Simi- 
larly in seventeenth-century France, the dissemination of the king's por- 
trait sometimes weakens but most often reinforces the belief that the 
portrait of the king is the king-a king who no longer has merely "two 
bodies," but a multitude. 
93. Guth Kanda, Shinzo, p. 20. 
94. See Tambiah, The Buddhzst Saznts of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets. 
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Double, Double, Toil and Trouble 
In China, the first effigies, sometimes automata, are found in graves 
and seem to have been substitutes for real people, meant to accompany 
the deceased to the other world.95 As Delahaye points out, "the doubles, 
ou, are beings, living or not, with whom one forms a couple. In numerol- 
ogy, ou refers to even numbers; it is opposed to qi, meaning odd number, 
but also unique, extraordinary, which has no match" ("AM," p. 52 n. 7).96 
The icons are therefore quite literally "figures or images of the dou- 
ble" (in Chinese, ouxiang; in Japanese, guz6, meaning "statue" or "idol"). 
The original may be the god, or the worshipper. The correspondence 
between the icon and its human counterpart is such that the sympathetic 
magic works even on iconoclasts. We are told, for instance, of a despot 
who urinated on a statue that he had put in the privy and later suffered 
from a terrible pain in the scrotum that ceased only when he r e ~ e n t e d ; ~ '  
and of the case of an iconoclastic Tang emperor, who, upon finding out 
that an icon of Guanyin had not been destroyed according to his orders, 
hit it in the chest and subsequently died of chest cancer. The notion of 
physical correspondence between the icon and its human counterpart is 
a basic feature of black magic.g8 It also explains why people in Japan often 
stick an ex-voto or a golden leaf on the icon or caress its body at the point 
corresponding to the part of their body which hurts. An interesting case 
is that of the bodhisattva Kuginuki ("Nail-pulling") Jizd, whose emblem 
is a pair of pliers. In a small temple in Kyoto, dedicated to that particular 
Jizd, the presence at the gate of a giant pair of pliers, the size of a person 
and wearing a child's bib, shows the complex nature of some icons. One 
could, paraphrasing Magritte, say, "this is not a pair of pliers" (although 
clearly Magritte's point was different). It represents at the same time an 
obvious symbolism (the nail as physical pain, nail-pulling as removing the 
95. See Li Chi: Book of Rztes; An Encyclopedia of Ancient Ceremonial Usages, Religzous Creeds, 
and Social Institutiom, trans. James Legge, ed. Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, 2 vols. (Hyde 
Park, N.Y., 1967), 1:173. See also J. J. M. de Groot, The Religzous System of China: Its Ancient 
F o m ,  Evolution, History and Present Aspect, Manners, Customs, and Social Institutions Connected 
Therewith, 6 vols. (1892; Taipei, 1982), 2:806-11. 
96. The Dictionnaire fran~ais de la langue chinoise (Taipei, 1976), S.V. "ou," has: "statue 
(representing a person), doll, idol; even number; together; to pair, to mate; pair, couple, 
member of a couple, spouse, partner; to match, to go together, etc.; to coincide, hence 
coincidence: fortuitous, chance, accidental." Qi also means "to exceed," "remainder," "bad 
luck," "bad omen." 
97. See Donald E. Gjertson, "The Early Chinese Buddhist Miracle Tale: A Preliminary 
Survey,"Journal ofthe American Oriental Society 101 (July-Sept. 1981): 297. 
98. In his famous description of sympathetic magic, Frazer mentions the Chinese "ef- 
figies made of bamboo splinters and paper" known as "'substitutes of persons,"' which could 
be used to inflict harm on one's enemies (J. G. Frazer, The Magzc Art and the Evolution of 
Kings, vol. 1 of The Golden Bough: A Stwly in Magtc and Religion, 3d ed. [London, 191 11, p. 
60). See also Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity, pp. 44-58. 
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pain) and a substitute body, not only of Jizd (as indicated by the bib, a 
traditional attribute of this protector of children), but also of the worship- 
per, who touches this paradoxical, nonanthropomorphic "Buddha to 
stroke" at various places before rubbing the corresponding painful parts 
of his or her own body. 
The icons of the Buddha are sometimes compared to the "original" 
shadow that he is said to have left in a cave at Nagarahara, in Central 
Asia. This shadow, which became the source of another iconographic tra- 
dition, was described by the Chinese pilgrim Xuanzang (600-664), who 
was able to see it only after prostrating himself several hundred times. 
The shadow, invisible at first, eventually appeared in its full glory, with a 
cohort of bodhisattvas and celestial musicians, "as when the clouds open 
to reveal the golden M o ~ n t a i n . " ~ ~  Likewise, the first Chan patriarch Bod- 
hidharma left his shadow on a rock on Mount Song, near the cave where 
he had practiced his legendary "wall contemplation." As a focus of wor- 
ship in the ChanlZen tradition, this shadow plays a role equivalent to that 
of another famous relic, the flesh-body or mummy of the sixth patriarch 
Huineng. 
The notion of the double leads us to examine the relation between 
the aura and the Freudian notion of the uncanny. Taking some of his 
cues from Hoffmann's story of the Sandman, Freud sees a paradigmatic 
example of uncanniness in the motif of the double, that is, in the relation 
between "persons who are considered identical by reason of looking 
alike." This relation, in Hoffmann, is accentuated "by transferring mental 
processes from the one person to the other-what we should call telepa- 
thy-so that the one possesses knowledge, feeling and experience in com- 
mon with the other, identifies himself with another person, so that his 
self becomes confounded, or the foreign self is substituted for his own- 
in other words, by doubling, dividing and interchanging the self."loO 
Freud considers that the double was originally a protection against the 
disappearance of the self, or, in Otto Rank's words, "an energetic denial 
of the power of death." He suggests that the "immortal" soul was the first 
double of the body (quoted in "U," p. 387). Originally a product of "pri- 
mary narcissism," an assurance of immortality, the double tends to be- 
come, when the narcissistic phase is left behind, precisely the opposite: a 
ghastly harbinger of death ("U," p. 387). The conscience is another kind 
of double, a psychological double, but one that does not produce a feeling 
of the uncanny. Thus, for Freud, the double, as a figure of the uncanny, 
is the return of something once "familiar" but eventually repressed ("U," 
99. See Hwui Li, The Life ofHzuen-Tsiang, ed. Samuel Beal (London, 1914), p. 62. See 
also Malcolm David Eckel, "The Power of the Buddha's Absence: On the Foundations of 
Mahayana Buddhist Ritual," Journal of Ritual Studzes 4 ,  no. 2 (1990): 68. 
100. Sigmund Freud, "The 'Uncanny,"' Collected Papers, trans. and ed. Joan Riviere, 4 
vols. (New York, 1925), 4:386-87; hereafter abbreviated "U." 
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p. 394). It is in particular the return, or apparent confirmation, of animis- 
tic beliefs that we thought we had surmounted (see "U," p. 402). 
One of the best expressions of the uncanniness of the double is given 
by Oscar Wilde in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Here, a reversal takes place 
between the "real" (Dorian Gray) and his double (his portrait), his "truth 
in painting." The portrait undergoes all kinds of changes while Dorian 
remains eternally young, until he tries to get rid of his shadow, the silent 
witness to his depravation, without realizing that it is himself. By trying 
to destroy it, he ends up killing himself, effecting one last re~ersal . '~ '  This 
illustration of the expression "le mort saisit le vif" recalls the traditional 
Chinese belief that the subject of a painting sometimes dies when the 
painting is finished: all his or her life flows into the double. It explains in 
part the custom of painting only the portraits of the dead. 
The multiplication of icons in medieval Japan-which could be seen, 
with some qualifications, as their commodification-suggests the rele- 
vance of the problematic of fetishism and projection. A notion of projec- 
tion that prefigures the Marxist concept can be found at the basis of the 
idealist tendency in Mahayana Buddhism (Yogacara, Chan), but it was 
counterbalanced, in other parts of this tradition ("gradual" Chan, Pure 
Land, Vajrayana), by a belief that subjects do not necessarily alienate 
themselves or become dependent on objects (icons) when they project 
themselves into them. The priest who projects his Buddhahood into a 
material support, a wooden icon, does not fall into the trap of fetishism- 
let alone of primary narcissism. He can eventually bridge the gap, the 
cleavage of the self, when he reintegrates in his self-consciousness the 
power temporarily projected into the icon. Here again we encounter 
the metaphor of the symbol, the split image, and the reunion of the tal- 
lies: divided in order to be reunited. Another paradigmatic expression of 
the folded structure of reality and its resolution is found in Hegel's state- 
ment, "As a spirit, man does not have an immediate existence but is essen- 
tially returned-home-to-self (in sich Zuriickgekehrtes). This movement of 
mediation (Vermittelung) is an essential moment of the spirit. Its activity 
consists in transcending and negating its immediacy so as to return upon 
itself (Riickkehr in sich)."lO' 
Whereas Freud saw in the objectivation of doubles a return of the 
repressed, Clkment Rosset analyzes it in metaphysical terms as an instinc- 
tive denial of immediacy, the constant search for a deeper, hidden reality 
that replicates, subverts, or legitimizes that of the everyday world. Here 
the duplicated original is no longer an object or event of the outside 
world but the subject itself.'03 It is the very self that loses some of its onto- 
101. See Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (New York, 1993). 
102. Quoted in Derrida, Glas, trans. John F! Leavey, Jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln, 
Nebr., 1986), p. 28. 
103. See ClCment Rosset, Le Riel et son double (Paris, 1976), p. 84. 
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logical reality that becomes the double, the shadow of a greater reality. 
Speculations about the shadow, or the double, lead to a feeling well ex- 
pressed by Rimbaud: "Je est un autre."'04 Rosset denounces this feeling as 
an illusion that will ultimately receive a reality check with the advent of 
death. As in the case of the French and English kings, the ChantZen mas- 
ter's two bodies turn out to be a mere single body, and a very mortal 
one.lo5 "The different aspects of [this illusion]," writes Rosset, "refer to a 
same function, a same structure, a same failure. The function: to protect 
one from the real. The structure: not to refuse to perceive the real, but 
to double it. The failure: to recognize too late in the protecting double 
the very same real against which one believed to have guarded oneself."lo6 
The Buddhist theory of the Two Truths, or two levels of reality, intro- 
duces into the real a duplicity of which the iconic doubles are merely 
particular cases. In a poem on an icon, for instance, the Lu Shan master 
Huiyuan reflects on the Buddha's simultaneous existence on both levels: 
"In the tasteless void he has sketched his countenance. 1 Touching the 
surface of emptiness he transmitted his image."lo5 The much-vaunted 
iconoclasm of ChantZen, based on the notion of immediacy, is belied by 
the adherence of this school to the Two Truths theory, which implies a 
bifurcation of the real, two levels of reality rather than a single, and there- 
fore the use of symbols to mediate between them, to bridge the gap. This 
two-tiered structure should be seen as the symbolic structure, the struc- 
ture of the symbol itself. Thus, the opposite (and counterpart) of imme- 
diacy is mediation, duplication, the double, the icon. The ChantZen 
rhetoric of immediacy is also a rhetoric of iconoclasm.108 Conversely, there 
is a rhetoric of mediacy-that of iconophilia. 
Consider the Japanese contrast between the butsuzd (Buddhist icon) 
and the shinzd (icon of the kami, or god): whereas the latter were made of 
a single block, the former were, from the eleventh century onward, usu- 
ally made of joined woodblocks. Like the shintai (divine body)-a sacred 
mirror in the case of the sun-goddess Arnaterasu-the shinzd clearly func- 
104. Arthur Rimbaud, 'AGeorges Izambard," in Rimbaud, Cros, Corbiire, Lautriamont: 
Oeuurespodtzques completes, ed. Alain Blottikre et al. (Paris, 1980), p. 184. 
105. See Alain Boureau, Le Simple Corps du roi: CImpossible Sacraliti des souverains fran- 
~ a i s ,  Xl/e-XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1988)-a critical complement to Ernest H. Kantorowicz's The 
King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, N.J.,  1957). 
106. "Les difftrents aspects de l'illusion dtcrits ci-dessus renvoient ?iune m&me fonc- 
tion, P une m&me structure, P une m&me tchec. La fonction: prottger du  rtel. La structure: 
non pas refuser de percevoir le rtel, mais le dtdoubler. L'tchec: reconnaitre trop tard dans 
le double protecteur le reel m@me dont on croyait s'@tre gardt" (Rosset, Le Riel et son double, 
p. 123). 
107. Quoted in Shaw, "Buddhist and Taoist Influences on Chinese Landscape Paint- 
ing," p. 199. See also Erik Ziircher, The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation 
of Buddhism in Early Medieval China, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1959), 1:242-3. 
108. On the rhetoric of iconoclasm in Western discourse, see Mitchell, Iconology, pp. 
160-208, and Goux, Symbolic Economies, pp. 134-50. 
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tions as a double; there is only one in each shrine, and it is hidden. Guth 
contrasts this unicity with the multiplication in Buddhism of images that 
function primarily as aids to v i sua l i~a t ion .~~~  However, one should distin- 
guish between those Buddhist icons that are multiplied and offered to 
the gaze of worshippers and those-like the master's portrait (chinz6), the 
mummy, or the "hidden Buddhas" (hibutsu)-that remain sequestered in 
the temple's inner sanctum. The former serve as aids to visualization (but 
also as ex-votos), whereas the latter remain the invisible bodies (or 
doubles) of the gods. 
The Buddhist Ideology of Aniconism 
Aniconism is not a lack of images, a default, but rather an excess, 
crossing through and beyond images. Recently, Susan Huntington has 
reopened the old "debate on Buddhist aniconism" by arguing that "rep- 
resentations of Buddhas were being produced at the same time as the so- 
called aniconic relief^.""^ Huntington correctly points out the presuppo- 
sitions regarding the superiority of iconism (and of WesternIGreek art) of 
Alfred Foucher and others. However, her claim that the aniconic symbols 
are not surrogates for Buddha images or descriptions of events in the life 
of the Buddha but "portraits" of the sites of Buddhist devotion merely 
displaces the problem. As she herself points out, these sites were them- 
selves surrogates for the Buddha, "traces" or "relics" ("EB," p. 406). Her 
belief in the "intrinsic meaning of the art" hardly represents progress, 
and Vidya Dehejia is right to emphasize in her response to Huntington 
the multivalence of emblems ("EB," p. 406)."l Regrettably, both Hunting- 
ton and Dehejia seem to ignore the work of Mus, although he provided a 
much more comprehensive solution to their problem by placing Buddhist 
imagery in the context of Brahmanic aniconism."' 
The traditional view that there were no images of the Buddha in 
early Buddhism led to the Orientalist belief that this religion was artisti- 
cally, therefore spiritually, inferior. Yet, as Freedberg notes, aniconism (or 
nonfigurative art) is always on the side of "spirituality" (PI, p. 54).l13 In 
109. See Guth Kanda, ShinzG, pp. 18-22. 
110. Susan L. Huntington, "Early Buddhist Art and the Theory of Aniconism," Art 
Journal 49 (Winter 1990): 402; hereafter abbreviated "EB." See also Vidya Dehejia, "Anicon- 
ism and the Multivalence of Emblems," Ars Orientalis 21 (1990): 45-66. Dehejia argues that, 
while it is true that Foucher misstated the nature and extent of aniconism, he was accurate 
in perceiving its existence; see p. 64. 
11 1. On Foucher, see also ''I!V.'' 
112. See Mus, Barabudul; pp. 43-45, 60-66. 
113. The best representative of this trend is probably Wassily Kandinsky, On the Spiri- 
tual in Art, in Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art, trans. and ed. Kenneth C. Lindsay and 
Peter Vergo, 2 vols. (Boston, 1982), 1:114-219. 
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the Indian context, however, Buddhist aniconism should have been read 
as a claim for spiritual superiority. In China as well, there is a strong 
connection between xenophobia and the Confucian criticism of the cult 
of images as a form of degeneration, as expressed by Confucians such as 
Yaochong or Han Yu. Similarly, ChanlZen iconoclasm is often seen as the 
expression of a Buddhist theory of the sublime or the unrepresentable. 
Consequently, ChanlZen paintings, with their rarefied atmosphere and 
their tendency toward abstraction, are perceived as a concrete illustration 
of the passage beyond the representation of objective reality, a freedom 
from what Kazimir Malevitch has called the useless weight of the object. 
However, the claim for aniconism or immediacy, wherever it is found, 
must be read as ideological. Aniconism is usually part of a general discur- 
sive strategy. For instance, with a similar aniconic gesture Plato denigrates 
materiality, mimesis, and the Cratylian conception of language, as well 
as the work of poets (ut pictura poesis). Standing at the other end of this 
philosophical tradition, Heidegger wants to present the work of art as a 
self-revelation of truth; however, in the process he reduces the image to 
the poem (ut poesis pictura). 
With their rationalist bent, orthodox Buddhists probably had an axe 
to grind against Indian polytheism and its cult of images. However, ar- 
cheological evidence seems to run contrary to their claims. Inasmuch as 
Buddhism is a product of Indian culture, there is reason to believe that 
the use of symbols in early Buddhism was never strictly the result of a 
purely aniconic teaching, a fortiori, of some figurative incapacity. Could 
we argue that the nonfigurative was perceived as ritually more efficient 
than the figurative? Freedberg would disagree. For him, there are only 
different kinds of likeness, some obvious to us, others not (see PI, p. 203). 
But this seems to beg the question. 
According to Mus, however, the nonfigurative nature of the Vedic 
fire altar, with its schemas, diagrams, and symbols, is precisely what 
makes it more strongly expressive of man and, more specifically, of his 
immortality. The altar is an architectural double, a substitute body made 
the size (taille)of the sacrificer. It is an image, a "symbol" in the etymologi- 
cal sense, that is, a temporary double of the sacrificer, whose final image 
will be his funerary tumulus, itself measured in the same way. This non- 
figurative yet ultrasymbolic monument is more sacred, more ritually effi- 
cacious, more "powerful," than any anthropomorphic figure. It is an 
eminent representation or "making-present," not an imperfect one. An-
thropomorphic figures or figurations appear only downstream; they are 
logically (not chronologically) derivative. A nonfigurative representation 
like the abstract linga of ~ i v a  remains more potent than any ithyphallic 
image. We also find hybrid cases, in which nonanthropomorphic icons 
are worshipped in anthropomorphic fashion: for instance, posts or 
erected stones are clothed like the more anthropomorphic representa- 
tions of the deity and/or dotted with eyes. In this context, Mus argues, 
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the aniconism of ancient Buddhist art no longer seems problematic: it 
can be seen as a partial, reserved, or eminent ani~onism."~ Similarly, in 
the Hindu temple, icons are projections of the central god, which is often 
a nonfigurative linga. The notions of aniconic center and iconic periphery 
explain the importance of the circumambulation (pradak$nd) that leads 
the practitioner from periphery to center, from bottom to top, from the 
senses to the spirit, from multiplicity to oneness. 
From the question of aniconism, we move now, in circumambulatory 
fashion, to those of figuration, anthropomorphism, and realism, which 
are at the center of Freedberg's work on the "power of images." Verisimili- 
tude is indeed important, not only in the case of the funerary portraits 
(chinzG), but for all Buddhist images modelled after the Udayana icon. 
Yet the conventional view is that Indian art is after the type, not the indi- 
vidual; and one may argue that the hkyamuni of Seiry6ji in Kyoto, sup- 
posedly a replica of the Udayana icon itself, is quite "typical." There is a 
tension between the symbol (for instance the usnisa), which connotes di- 
vine transcendence, and a verisimilitude that denotes humanity-al- 
though the distinction is not always clear-cut (the usnea may at times 
simply represent a concrete fleshy protuberance on the top of the head). 
If resemblance is the goal, how do we explain the coexistence of resem- 
bling and nonresembling icons? Freedberg claims that we may not see 
what other cultures see as resemblance. But, precisely, what is the line 
between what we see as resembling and what we do not see as such? If 
this line is not the same for all, how can one claim that we all look for the 
same verisimilitude? How do we avoid the teleological schema (de- 
nounced by Freedberg) and say that the verisimilitude aimed at by "prim- 
itives"-in their fetishes for instance-is not as verisimilar as ours? How 
do we include under that rubric objects that are clearly not very true to 
life, yet that are obviously quite powerful and animated? Why would a 
priest be glad to "dot the eyes" of a funerary tablet when he could instead 
dot the eyes of a wax effigy? Should we not keep an eye on that distinc- 
tion? Can we simply reduce everything to figuration? A conception of 
verisimilitude that relies on figuration implies a notion of mimesis, which 
is understood quite differently in the Chinese or Japanese contexts. How 
does it play out in the case of Buddhist "realism" (for example, the Kama- 
kura statuary)? Is the addition of real hair aimed at making the icon more 
"realistic" (that is, at verisimilitude) or more "real" (that is, at animation)? 
Why, if we admit Freedberg's point, would the eucharist have remained 
noniconic, yet so powerful? Why not some homunculus, a kind of ginger- 
bread man, then? Surely not simply because the cannibalistic nature of 
the ritual would have become too obvious and unpalatable? 
The resemblance between the icon and its worshipper is not so much 
a question of verisimilitude as one of size (as noted earlier, the Vedic altar 
114. See Mus, Barabudur 
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and Buddhist icons are made according to the size of the worshipper) 
and of the presence of certain symbolic markers. Even when likeness is 
deemed essential, it is not sufficient. A case in point is that of a decorative 
painting by Huang Quan, a tenth-century Chinese painter who special- 
ized in flower and bird paintings, on the walls of the palace of the King 
of Shu, that was so realistic that a falcon offered to the king mistook the 
painted pheasants in it for real ones.lI5 The text commemorating the inci- 
dent states that "among the six principles" of higher art, only the "resem- 
blance to form" and the "harmony of breath" are essential. If the 
"harmony of breath" is found without formal resemblance, substance 
dominates over ornament. To have only "formal resemblance," however, 
is like having the flower without the fruit. While likeness and spirit are 
harmoniously balanced here, in many other texts the emphasis is on the 
spirit. A case in point is that of Gu Kaizhi, who would paint a portrait and 
sometimes not dot the eyes for several years. When someone asked his 
reason for this, Gu replied, "'The beauty or ugliness of the four limbs 
basically bears no relation to the most subtle part of a painting. What 
conveys the spirit and portrays the likeness lies precisely in these dots.'"116 
In the case of sculptures, too, one can distinguish between animation in 
principle ("installation of breath") and in fact (for example, articulate 
limbs). In Western art as well, a prejudice against verisimilitude is evi- 
dent, but it appeared quite late and did not constitute a dominant feature 
of the iconic tradition. This explains Freedberg's emphasis on the power 
of likeness, but it does not justify his attempt to generalize it to non- 
Western cultures. Many of his conclusions derive from the fact that his 
narrative moves, as it were, teleologically, from the figurative to the non- 
figurative icon (and not the other way around). Asian "realism" arises 
not only from increasing skill in naturalistic representation but from a 
conscious will to render the invisible visible, or the dead present. In Bud- 
dhist hagiography, the mummy of a dead master, when it happens to be 
discovered, always looks "as if aliven-precisely the same topos found in 
the case of a "realistic" icon. 
Where Freedberg sees sexuality arousing the beholder because of the 
likeness of the image, Heidegger would see the unfolding (Ereignis) of 
Being: "This nature of truth which is familiar to us-correctness in repre- 
sentation-stands and falls with truth as unconcealedness of beings" 
("OW," p. 52). What Freedberg considers to be the ne plus ultra of verisi- 
militude, the real costume of certain icons, can play quite a different role 
in the Buddhist context. There are some well-known cases in Japanese 
Buddhism of icons whose body is represented with "soft" realism (for 
115. This calls to mind the painting of a nineteenth-century experiment, whose refer- 
ence escapes me, in which real cows are put in front of painted cows to test the mimetic 
quality ofthe painting in the painting. 
116. Liu Yiqing, Shishuo xinyu jiaojian (Collected Notes on 'A New Account of Tales of 
the tt'orld"). 
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instance, the so-called naked Jizd or Benzaiten). These icons were origi- 
nally clothed like noble human beings. The same is true of the mummies 
of Buddhist priests. However, one may wonder what role this parure 
(Kant's parergon) plays in the general economy of Buddhist ritual. In a 
seminal essay entitled "Le Buddha park" (The Adorned Buddha) Mus 
has shown in the case of s2kyamuni that the nature of an icon can change 
along with its parure, its finery: instead of descending further into the 
world of appearances, as we might assume at first glance, it now tran- 
scends it; it no longer manifests its (relative) "metamorphic body" (nirmd- 
nakqa), but its (absolute) "dharma body" (dharmakaya).117 But things are 
not always so paradoxically simple, and one may argue that, in most cases, 
the uncarved woodblock (or at least the single woodblock icon) is closer 
to the transcendental Buddha. We seem to have here two different ways 
of conceiving the excess of representation (the sublime): as an additional 
layer of symbolism (cloth, parergon), or as a total stripping (like the nu- 
dity of the "heavenly-clad" ascetic in Jainism). 
And So? 
It is clearly impossible to return to a premodern conception of the 
icon, or to retrieve non-Western conceptions of it, to abandon the vantage 
point (or disadvantage point) of our self-centered perspective. I sug-
gested above that an intrinsic quality of the modern (and, by the way, 
predominantly male) gaze is the violence it does to images. Perhaps one 
cannot avoid the most subtle forms of that violence. At any rate, there is 
little to be gained by adopting a nostalgic approach that idealizes the past 
(an idealization that is just the other side of the coin, as the case of Sega- 
len shows) and clings to tradition. 
Our use (or abuse) of these icons may be not only the unavoidable 
outcome of modern commodity fetishism but also part of a Western prag- 
matic which consists in installing cultural fragments in another context 
(Malraux's musie imaginaire), reinscribing them in another structure, and 
thus establishing another circulation of power. These icons remind me 
of Nancy Jay's example of the churinga (an Australian Aboriginal ritual 
instrument, a sort of bull-roarer) in a museum, which she compared to 
Confederate money, about which one thing is certain: it is no longer 
money, although we do not know what kind of object it is.llR One could 
also argue that, despite the apparent novelty, there is nothing radically 
new here: the icon was always already reinscribed or disseminated. If we 
117. Mus, "Le Buddha park. Son Origine indienne. Cakyamuni dans le mahayanisme 
moyen," pt. 2 of " ~ t u d e s  indiennes et indochinoises," Bulletin de 1'~cole Frantaise d'Extrime- 
Orient 28 nos. 1-2 (1928): 197. 
118. See Nancy Jay, Throughout Your Generations Forez~er: Sacrjfice, Religion, and Paternity 
(Chicago, 1992), p. 12. 
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still believe that this disenchantment is radical and irreversible, should 
we then mourn it? Benjamin was the first to theorize this disenchantment 
of the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. The example 
he focusses on, the photograph, is interesting since, as he rightly points 
out, it retains some of the individual aura (and we know that photos can 
be used as substitute bodies in black magic). But above all, if some photos 
do lose their aura through reproduction, others regain another type of 
aura, or, rather, present an aura that was not apparent in the original 
subject. Clearly, the reproduction of votive images does not result in the 
loss of their aura; Benjamin's earlier insight that the aura was in part the 
product of the photographical technique would seem more to the point 
here.'lg At any rate, the notion of aura might be useful even in the case of 
noncultic images. One could also argue that the multiplication of images, 
rather than depleting their aura, renders presence "immediate and indu- 
bitable" (PI, p. 177). This is true with the portrait of the ruler, in the 
absolute monarchy that emerged in seventeenth-century France, as well 
as today in all regimes based on a cult of personality. Although Benjamin 
at one point considered the loss of the aura as a necessary counterpart to 
the democratization of art, in his argument about the unity of the work 
of art in its aura we can also perhaps hear a distant echo of the discourse 
of censorship, according to which prints, like photographs, are vulgar 
"because they can get into the hands of the vulgus, the crowd," and "are 
therefore not like art" (PI,p. 361). 
There is therefore no need to wax nostalgic or nihilistic about the 
loss of the aura in the age of mechanical reproduction or the inauthentic- 
ity of the technical epoch. As Jean-Fransois Lyotard remarks, Being 
"didn't choose CCzanne to express itself.""O After all, the grandiloquent 
disclosure of truth that Heidegger attributed to the work of art can occur 
in the photos of, say, Man Ray or Henri Cartier-Bresson-and, with some 
luck, in my own amateurish photos as well. Similarly, the erotic aura is 
not limited to the "artistic" photos of Mapplethorpe. One could argue, as 
Freedberg does, that any erotic or pornographic picture has the potential 
to arouse a strong response from the beholder, to turn him into a voyeur. 
How this differs, then, from the voyeurism implicit in paintings like Gior- 
gione's Tempests-a voyeurism that is the main source of the fascination 
exerted by "classic" paintings such as this one-is not always clear. We 
may recall that fascination is derived from fascinus, the Latin word for 
phallus. Thus, my position here is by no means a nostalgic one. However, 
I want to emphasize again that the aura-which is perhaps not irrevers- 
ibly lost, but often ignored or eclipsed-is an important aspect of these 
artworks and that one way to retrieve it-as it were, dialectically, through 
a kind of Buddhist "skillful means" (upaya) that could later be conve- 
119. See Rochlitz, Le Disenchantement de l'art, p. 181. 
120. Lyotard, "Philosophy and Painting in the Age of Their Experimentation," p. 189. 
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niently abandoned-is to place it, as Benjamin argued, in its cultic con- 
text. This anthropological reinscription will help us to move beyond the 
cultural level to the phenomenological level. 
Passing through customary readings of the icon (the aesthetic, sym- 
bolic, economic, anthropological), we have shifted from its readablelvis- 
ible (or obvious) to its visual (or obtuse) dimension. The icon overflows 
from the aesthetic and symbolic spheres into the anthropological. The 
focus on the anthropological dimension referred to the belief in a pres- 
ence, a transcendent immanence of the icon. However, one must be able 
to go beyond that dimension toward the phenomenological dimension, 
where the experience of the aura, now desacralized, secularized, reveals 
a more originary aspect of sense perception."' Thus, going through the 
anthropological moment (by placing the icon in its cultural/cultic con- 
text), one ends up discovering a broader anthropological (in the philo- 
sophical sense) dimension of the aura, for which the cultic aspect is no 
longer essential, or, rather, from which it merely derives. 
The Buddhist icon, like any true icon, is a me'tkque ("wog"), as Segalen 
would have described it, but for reasons that have less to do with desig- 
nating cultural or artistic superiority or inferiority and more to do with 
the etymological root of the word (meta-oikos, literally, "one who moves to 
a different house"). This derivation is apt not only because the icon tends 
to move from temple to museum (or the antiquarian's shop) but because 
it is both within and above the oikos, the economy (oikonomia, the law of 
the house and of partition, distribution, and exchange): it simultaneously 
institutes the economic/iconomic circle and goes beyond it.'** In this hy- 
brid and highly unstable figure, all human me'tiques and me'tis (half-breed, 
half-cast, or half-caste-a related word, although of different etymology) 
will recognize their prototype. 
121. See Didi-Huberman, Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde, p. 125. 
122. See Derrida, Given Time: I.Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago, 1992), 
pp. 6-7, and Faure, Visions of Power, pp. 282-85. 
